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Abstract 
OCD is a common mental health problem which causes significant distress and reduced 
quality of life. Recovery rates remain low; behavioural and cognitive-behavioural models 
may be missing key constructs. People with OCD report higher levels of responsibility than 
the general population. If people with OCD feel responsible for preventing harm, it follows 
that they feel guilty about the prospect of causing harm. Pathological levels of guilt are 
associated with a poor prognosis in people with OCD. People with OCD also report 
distressing imagery, which is linked with high levels of emotional arousal. If people with 
OCD experience high levels of distress, negative imagery and guilt, they may be more 
sensitive to moral concerns.  
This study recruited 205 people to test three hypotheses relating to morality, imagery and 
guilt. Firstly, it was proposed that people in the low-OC group would demonstrate an 
intention bias and those in the high-OC group would not. Secondly, more frequent use of 
imagery would be associated with higher levels of OCD symptomatology, distress and guilt. 
Finally, state and trait guilt would mediate the relationship between imagery and OCD 
symptomatology. Participants completed an online survey comprised of questionnaires, moral 
dilemmas and a visual/verbal task. People in both the low- and high-OC groups demonstrated 
the intention bias, meaning the expected difference in moral judgments was not found. 
Imagery was associated with higher levels of OCD symptomatology, state and trait guilt but 
not distress. State and trait guilt also partially mediated the relationship between imagery and 
OCD symptomatology. These findings were considered in relation to the existing literature 
and the strengths and limitations of the study were discussed. The results suggested that 
future research should focus on developing interventions targeted at pathological guilt and 
distressing imagery. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Outline 
The present study aimed to explore moral judgments, guilt, and imagery in people with 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). This introductory literature review describes 
pertinent research drawn from the fields of moral psychology and philosophy and explains 
how this research links to the current study. The review will briefly describe relevant 
behavioural and cognitive models of OCD, including a consideration of research from 
analogue samples. It will explore recent literature, which indicates that responsibility and 
guilt have a key role in the maintenance of OCD. These morally relevant considerations 
affect the decisions people with OCD make and could be linked with obsessions and 
compulsions.  
The review will go on to discuss the role of imagery in psychopathology and OCD, before 
considering relevant moral philosophy literature. This will include models of moral decision-
making in non-clinical populations, along with an overview of the main characteristics of 
moral judgments. Finally, this chapter will focus on one specific bias found in moral 
decision-making (the ‘intention bias’) which may be relevant to understanding OCD. This 
will lead on to an outline of the rationale for the study and the main study hypotheses.  
1.2 Background 
OCD is a common mental health problem that causes significant distress and reduced quality 
of life. The disorder can lead to pervasive functional impairment which affects individuals’ 
work, social and family life (Huppert, Simpson, Nissenson, Liebowitz, & Foa, 2009). It is 
thought to affect approximately 2-3% of the population (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 
2005) and is ranked by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as among the ten most 
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debilitating mental health disorders (OCD-UK, 2017). The course of OCD tends to be 
chronic without effective treatment (Öst, Havnen, Hansen, & Kvale, 2015).  
OCD is diagnosed if people are (a) having “recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges, or 
images that are experienced… as intrusive and unwanted, and that in most individuals cause 
marked anxiety or distress” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 237). People may 
also be (b) engaging in “repetitive behaviours… (e.g. hand washing, ordering, checking) or 
mental acts… (praying, counting, repeating words silently) which the individual feels driven 
to perform in response to an obsession… aimed at preventing or reducing anxiety or distress, 
or preventing some dreaded event or situation” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 
237). In order to meet diagnostic criteria for OCD, the obsessions and/or compulsions must 
be “time-consuming (i.e. take more than one hour per day) or cause clinically significant 
distress or impairment” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 237).  
The treatment of choice for OCD is either Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) or 
Exposure and Response Prevention (ERP). In the case of severe OCD, this can be combined 
with medication in the form of a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI; NICE, 2014). 
A recent meta-analysis looked at the efficacy of CBT, as well as potential moderators that 
may be associated with treatment outcome (Olatunji, Davis, Powers, & Smits, 2013). CBT 
outperformed control conditions on the primary outcome measures at post-treatment and 
follow-up, however the authors concluded that more research is needed into maintenance 
processes in OCD that could be a target for more effective treatment options (Olatunji et al., 
2013). The recovery rates after recommended treatment are approximately 50-60% (Fisher & 
Wells, 2005). It is possible that psychological models may be missing important aetiological 
factors and maintenance processes that could provide an insight into alternative treatments 
(Chiang, 2013). Despite several years of research into cognitive-behavioural models, the 
14 
 
recovery rates remain unchanged and there is considerable scope to improve treatment 
efficacy (Fisher & Wells, 2005).  
1.3 Theoretical models of OCD 
1.3.1 Behavioural theory and ERP. To date, several psychological models accounting 
for the development and maintenance of OCD have been proposed (Altın & Gençöz, 2011). 
Initial research focused on a behavioural understanding of OCD (Markarian et al., 2010). 
According to the behavioural model of OCD, the disorder develops when an initially non-
threatening stimulus occurs at the same time as an anxiety-provoking stimulus (Hodgson & 
Rachman, 1977). Via the process of classical conditioning, an anxiety response becomes 
associated with an objectively non-threatening stimulus. When people experience heightened 
levels of anxiety, they are driven to respond by engaging in compulsive behaviours. As 
anxiety levels then subside, the compulsive behaviours are reinforced through operant 
conditioning (Mowrer, 1960).  
This behavioural understanding of OCD led to the development of ERP as a treatment. The 
rationale for ERP was that exposing individuals to the feared stimulus for a prolonged period 
of time would result in habituation (i.e., anxiety levels will subside naturally over time). 
While exposed to the feared stimulus, individuals are asked not to engage in compulsive 
behaviours or rituals. Behavioural theorists (e.g., Abramowitz, 1996) proposed that with 
repeated exposure, compulsive behaviours should become extinct in the absence of 
reinforcement.  
ERP has a recovery rate of approximately 60% (Fisher & Wells, 2005), however many 
people remain symptomatic following treatment (Foa & McLean, 2016). ERP has been 
criticised, as whilst it treats the overt compulsions found in some cases of OCD, it cannot 
directly address obsessional thoughts, which are a key feature of the disorder and sometimes 
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occur in the absence of compulsions. ERP has also been associated with a high drop-out rate 
and poor treatment compliance (Salkovskis & Westbrook, 1989).  
1.3.2 Cognitive-behavioural theory and CBT. Due to some of the apparent 
problems with behavioural theory and the associated ERP treatment, research progressed to 
examine the content and characteristics of obsessional thoughts. In a non-clinical study, 
Rachman and da Silva (1978) found that their participants had intrusive thoughts that are 
similar in content to those found in individuals with OCD. A more recent study (Julien, 
O’Connor & Aardema, 2009) found that 80-99% of people in the non-clinical population 
have experienced intrusive thoughts at some point in their life. There is significant support 
for the idea that there is a continuum between ‘normal’ individuals and people with OCD, 
including cognitive-behavioural research (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; Salkovskis, 1985) and 
data from non-clinical samples (Abramowitz et al., 2014).  
Salkovskis (1985) drew on the finding that intrusive thoughts are a universal experience and 
compared intrusions to the negative automatic thoughts (NATs) described in cognitive theory 
(Beck, 1976). Unlike NATs, which are often consistent with an individual’s belief system, 
intrusions are ego-dystonic. Most people experience intrusive thoughts without any related 
distress; however, Salkovskis (1985) proposed that people with OCD interpret the occurrence 
of intrusions differently. Specifically, he suggested that when people with OCD have an 
intrusive thought, they think that they are a bad person for having this intrusion, or that they 
are responsible for the intrusion and its potential consequences. This threatening appraisal of 
an intrusion triggers an anxiety response and people engage in compulsive behaviours to 
reduce their anxiety. People then experience a sense of relief as their anxiety subsides and the 
compulsive behaviours are reinforced.  
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Salkovskis' (1985) initial cognitive model has subsequently been elaborated by a number of 
other researchers. The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG; 1997) 
proposed a number of belief-domains that could explain the development and maintenance of 
OCD, including an intolerance of uncertainty, overestimation of threat, perfectionism and a 
need to control thoughts. Each of these beliefs could make individuals more vulnerable to 
distress when they experience an intrusive thought, as they appraise intrusions as threatening. 
This sense of threat and elevated level of anxiety then leads to compensatory compulsive 
behaviour (see Figure 1.1). Rachman (1997, 1998) also proposed that the meaning of 
intrusive thoughts is important: if intrusions are interpreted as personally relevant and 
catastrophic, people will feel distressed, act to neutralise their intrusions and experience 
further intrusions in the future. 
Figure 1.1. Cognitive model of OCD (OCCWG, 1997).   
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The dysfunctional belief systems shown in Figure 1.1 mean that people with OCD are more 
vulnerable to common thinking errors (Rachman, 1997; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 
1996). For example, people with OCD may think that having a distressing intrusive thought is 
the same as acting in line with that thought. The concept of ‘thought-action fusion (TAF)’ or 
‘magical thinking’ leads individuals to believe that if they think about bad things, they will 
act consistently with those thoughts or cause bad things to happen.   
1.3.3 Dysfunctional appraisals: responsibility. Individuals with OCD respond to the 
belief that they will be responsible for bad things happening by taking action to prevent such 
consequences. This presents as compulsive behaviour. Altın and Gençöz (2011) proposed 
that individuals will take action in response to a cognitive intrusion because they believe that 
they will be responsible for harm if they do not. Researchers have therefore considered the 
possibility that people with OCD consider themselves highly responsible for preventing harm 
coming to themselves or others. Salkovskis, Richards, and Forrester (1995, as cited in 
OCCWG, 1997, p. 677) defined responsibility in the context of OCD as “… the belief that 
one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative 
outcomes. These outcomes may be actual, that is having consequences in the real world, 
and/or at a moral level.” 
Salkovskis (1996) proposed that people with OCD have higher levels of responsibility than 
the general population. This sense of responsibility is a consequence of the belief that 
individuals have the power to prevent bad outcomes from occurring. In a study with a non-
clinical sample, Mancini, D’Olimpio, and Cieri (2004) found that when perceived 
responsibility was manipulated and increased, obsessive-like behaviour also increased as a 
consequence. When people believe they are responsible for a bad outcome, they are more 
likely to try and take action to prevent it. In an earlier study, Ladouceur et al. (1995) found a 
similar effect: when participants were made to feel responsible for the outcome of their 
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actions, they became more preoccupied with how they performed an action and demonstrated 
increased hesitation and checking. These studies show that in non-clinical populations, there 
is a clear positive correlation between level of responsibility and OC-type symptoms. In a 
recent meta-analysis, Abramowitz et al. (2014) argued that findings in non-clinical samples 
are highly relevant to understanding psychopathology in clinical populations, as OCD 
symptoms exist on a spectrum. If responsibility is correlated with OCD symptoms in a non-
clinical population, this has important implications for understanding how this construct is 
related to OCD symptoms in a clinical population.  
Salkovskis (1996) also stated that the increased sense of responsibility found in individuals 
with OCD may extend beyond the prevention of bad outcomes in the real world to the idea 
that bad outcomes should be prevented at a purely moral level. As the concept of 
responsibility includes a moral component, researchers have recently started to investigate the 
role that heightened moral sensitivity may play in perpetuating OCD symptoms (Doron, Sar-
El, & Mikulincer, 2012; Franklin, McNally, & Riemann, 2009).  
It is possible that heightened moral sensitivity may be more or less relevant to particular 
subtypes of OCD, depending on the nature of intrusive thoughts and images in each subtype. 
Intrusions may be interpreted as more or less morally reprehensible depending on their 
content, which is linked to the subtype(s) of OCD that an individual has. Sookman, 
Abramowitz, Calamari, Wilhelm, and McKay (2005) proposed that there are four main 
subtypes of OCD: contamination/cleaning, checking (evoked by harming, aggressive, or 
sexual obsessions), obsessions without overt compulsions, and hoarding. Researchers have 
found that heightened moral sensitivity is related to OC-like compulsions to clean (e.g., 
Doron, Kyrios, & Moulding, 2007; Doron et al., 2012; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Doron et 
al. (2007) also found that heightened moral sensitivity is related to checking compulsions. 
Moral sensitivity has clearly been implicated in the cleaning and checking subtypes of OCD. 
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It could also be the case that this construct is relevant to obsessions without overt 
compulsions, as ‘moral TAF’ (Salkovskis, Richards, & Forrester, 1995) could mean that 
simply having a ‘bad’ thought elicits high levels of guilt, shame and anxiety (Shafran, 
Thordarson, et al., 1996). There is no evidence that moral sensitivity is relevant to the 
hoarding OCD subtype, however there is a growing body of evidence that hoarding is distinct 
from OCD and should not be considered a subtype of the disorder (Frost, Hristova, Steketee, 
& Tolin, 2013). The nature of intrusions (image or verbal thought, more or less morally 
relevant) might determine the strength of an individual’s emotional response and subsequent 
compulsive behaviour, and it is possible that these may differ as a function of subtype. 
However, examination at the level of subtypes was beyond the scope of the present study.   
1.3.4 Guilt and OCD. As heightened moral sensitivity has been linked with certain 
subtypes of OCD, it has been proposed that guilt (a moral emotion) may also play a part in 
the maintenance of the disorder (Shapiro & Stewart, 2011). Mancini and Gangemi (2004) 
proposed that people with OCD are afraid of feeling guilty because they feel responsible for 
preventing bad outcomes. Chiang (2013) also pointed out that, in order to experience guilt, an 
individual typically feels responsible for a transgression. If people with OCD are more likely 
than the general population to evaluate themselves as responsible for preventing harm, it 
follows that they would feel guilty in anticipation of harm occurring. The concepts of 
responsibility and guilt are clearly linked.  
Guilt has been thought of as an adaptive social emotion that has a strong evolutionary 
importance in preventing humans from harming each other (e.g., Basile, Mancini, Macaluso, 
Caltagirone, & Bozzali, 2014). Kugler and Jones (1992) define guilt as an emotion that arises 
when a moral or social standard is violated. At a moderate level, guilt serves a positive social 
function in inhibiting harmful behaviour or in stimulating impulses to seek forgiveness; 
however, excessive guilt can result in psychopathology (Basile et al., 2014). 
20 
 
Mancini and Gangemi (2004) proposed that high levels of guilt are associated with greater 
symptom severity in OCD. One study showed that when a group of non-clinical participants 
were made to feel guilty, this experience led to OCD-like symptoms: an increased sense of 
responsibility, intrusive thoughts and a more developed sense of threat (Gangemi, Mancini, & 
Van den Hout, 2007).  
Evidence from non-clinical functional neuroimaging studies also supports the link between 
high levels of guilt and OCD symptomatology. Researchers have found that the experience of 
guilt is associated with the activation of regions in the brain that have previously been 
implicated in OCD (Hennig-Fast et al., 2015; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Takahashi et al., 
2004). Similarly, in a clinical population, Jankowski and Takahashi (2014) found that people 
with OCD demonstrated increased activation in areas of the brain linked with the processing 
of guilt. Furthermore, Harrison et al. (2012) proposed that people with OCD can be defined 
as ‘hypermoral’ as they show differential brain activation compared with controls. People 
with OCD demonstrate increased activation of the medial orbitofrontal cortex, left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and middle temporal gyrus. These regions of the brain have 
previously been linked with the experience of moral emotions such as guilt and shame. 
In clinical populations, guilt has been linked with the experience of moral, sexual and 
religious obsessions and may also be a factor in aggressive, contamination-related and 
doubting compulsions (Shapiro & Stewart, 2011). However, researchers have provided 
different accounts of the roles of state and trait guilt in OCD. For the purposes of this review, 
‘state guilt’ is defined as a temporary affective experience, which results from recently 
violating a moral standard and ‘trait guilt’ is defined as stable and enduring, linked with 
historical events (Kugler & Jones, 1992).  
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Trait guilt has been associated with a higher level of OCD symptomatology and particularly 
‘not just right experiences’ (Chiang, 2013; Mancini, Gangemi, Perdighe, & Marini, 2008). 
Some studies have found that both state and trait guilt are important predictors of OCD 
symptomatology (Nissenson, 2006; Shafran, Watkins, & Charman, 1996; Steketee, Quay, & 
White, 1991). Other researchers have found that state guilt is an important predictor of OCD 
symptomatology only in people who self-report high trait guilt (Gangemi et al., 2007). 
Gangemi et al. (2007) found that when people were asked to write about a guilt-related life 
event (state-guilt induction), participants with high levels of trait guilt were more likely to 
evaluate a negative event as probable and severe. In other words, state guilt interacts with 
underlying trait guilt to cause OCD-like experiences. However, all of these studies were 
cross-sectional in nature, making it difficult to draw conclusions about whether guilt in OCD 
is a result of a temporary experience (state-guilt) or a more stable factor (trait-guilt; Shapiro 
& Stewart, 2011).   
More recently, Melli, Chiorri, Carraresi, Stopani, and Bulli (2015) looked at how trait guilt 
relates to the number of unacceptable thoughts that an individual experiences. They found 
that there were weak but significant positive correlations between trait guilt and unacceptable 
thoughts. However, regression analyses controlling for depression and anxiety showed that 
trait guilt was not a significant predictor of any dimension of OCD symptomatology. The 
evidence for a link between state- or trait-guilt and OCD is mixed and it is clear that further 
research is needed.  
Researchers have therefore started to investigate different types of guilt and whether it could 
actually be a fear of experiencing guilt that drives obsessions and compulsions (Mancini & 
Gangemi, 2004). In support of this idea, D’Olimpio and Mancini (2014) induced a fear of 
guilt in people with OCD by asking them to listen to a story in which the protagonist felt 
guilty. They found that when people with OCD felt more guilty this increased the frequency 
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of checking behaviour. Reuven, Liberman, and Dar (2013) found that people with OCD who 
washed their hands during an experimental procedure reported a reduction in the intensity of 
distressing moral emotions, including guilt. Also, Gangemi et al. (2007) induced guilt in a 
non-clinical population and found that this caused people to appraise a negative outcome as 
both more likely and more severe.  
There may be a distinction in OCD between different types of guilt. Mancini and Gangemi 
(2004) suggested that ‘deontological guilt’ arises when someone believes that they have 
violated a moral rule and ‘altruistic guilt’ arises when someone feels concerned that they have 
caused harm or pain to other people. In an fMRI study, Basile et al. (2014) showed that 
people with OCD are particularly sensitive to the induction of deontological guilt but not to 
altruistic guilt. People with OCD showed lower levels of activation in brain regions 
associated with the experience of deontological guilt than control participants (Basile et al., 
2014). The authors proposed that this difference could be explained by increased processing 
efficiency (‘Neural efficiency hypothesis’; Neubauer & Fink, 2009), as people with OCD are 
likely to be frequently exposed to the experience of guilt and may develop a learned response.  
Mancini and Gangemi (2015) went on to explore whether people with OCD are more 
motivated than non-clinical controls to prevent deontological guilt compared with altruistic 
guilt. Their first study showed that people with OCD make more cautious decisions than non-
clinical controls. OCD symptoms could therefore be understood as a consequence of the 
overvalued goal to prevent deontological guilt (i.e., not to violate moral norms; Mancini & 
Gangemi, 2015). People with OCD behave differently when exposed to the possibility of 
experiencing deontological guilt. Additionally, a second study showed that when 
deontological guilt was induced in non-clinical participants, they acted more cautiously than 
under normal conditions (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). Deontological guilt clearly has an 
effect on decision-making, in both clinical and non-clinical samples.  
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If fear of deontological guilt drives compulsive behaviour in non-clinical and clinical 
samples, it follows that deontological guilt may be an important treatment target in people 
with a diagnosis of OCD (Mancini & Gangemi, 2015). Confirming this, Cosentino et al. 
(2012) showed that an intervention to increase acceptance of the experience of guilt led to a 
reduction in obsessions in people with OCD.  
The experience of guilt is clearly linked with OCD symptomatology, although from the 
literature it remains unclear whether state guilt, trait guilt, deontological guilt, or fear of guilt 
provide the best explanation for the symptoms seen in people with OCD. Further research is 
needed into specific types of guilt and how these might be related to OCD symptomatology. 
The literature in this area is still developing and it is hoped that the present study will add to 
this knowledge base.  
1.4 Imagery 
In addition to the research into responsibility and guilt in OCD, there has also been a recent 
focus on imagery and how this mental process could be used to develop new treatments for 
the disorder. This review will now consider the research into imagery in psychopathology 
generally, before focusing on research that is particularly relevant to OCD.  
In many clinical disorders, imagery has been found to evoke high levels of emotional arousal 
which then plays a key part in maintenance cycles (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Imagery can 
involve multiple sensory modalities, including smells, sounds or distressing bodily 
sensations. The powerful sensations and emotions evoked by imagery may be a critical part 
of psychopathology (Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, & Dalgleish, 2008).  
Initial research into imagery by Lang (1979) proposed that mental images may directly 
influence emotional systems in the brain, particularly when these images contain information 
that is relevant to associated autonomic or behavioural responses. For example, if someone 
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imagines a poisonous spider, their autonomic response might include breathing faster or 
sweating, they may experience intense fear and their behavioural instinct might be to prepare 
to run away. Distressing images have a direct impact on people both physiologically and 
emotionally.  
In OCD, intrusive images link with compulsive behaviour. For example, images of germs 
invading the skin (contamination) can lead to increased washing behaviour (Rachman, 2007). 
Speckens, Hackmann, Ehlers, and Cuthbert (2007) found that 81% of participants with severe 
OCD reported intrusive imagery and in 76% of these participants, the images were followed 
by engagement in compulsive behaviours. The vivid intrusive images reported in OCD may 
make moral considerations salient, for example if people imagine the suffering of potential 
victims (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). People with OCD often foresee a range of possible 
negative outcomes such as their home burning down or their loved ones catching an incurable 
disease (Salkovskis et al., 1995). These distressing images might also make people more 
likely to believe that their feared outcome will actually occur (Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  
It is clear that distressing intrusive images lead to a powerful emotional response. Holmes 
and Mathews (2010) noted that intrusive images lead to a more intense emotional response 
than verbal intrusions. This could be because images are vivid and realistic, whereas verbal 
thoughts can be more easily dismissed as they are more abstract (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 
2010; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, and Kosslyn (2015) argue that 
the content of images compared with verbal thoughts is subtly different. The distinction 
between images and verbal thoughts is likely to be important in therapy, however mental 
health clinicians have not always been trained to ask whether clients experience distressing 
imagery, although they routinely ask about verbal thoughts (Holmes, Blackwell, Burnett 
Heyes, Renner, & Raes, 2016). If distressing imagery elicits strong emotion it seems 
important to address this at assessment and in therapy, however imagery is not typically 
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addressed in standard evidence-based treatment for OCD. As distressing imagery is such a 
common experience in OCD, information about it should provide an important contribution 
to a more complete understanding of the development and maintenance of the disorder 
(Speckens et al., 2007). Building on the existing evidence base for imagery-based treatments 
in other anxiety disorders (e.g., Arntz, 2012), researchers have started to develop novel 
imagery-based treatments tailored to OCD in the hope that therapy outcomes can be 
improved (e.g., Veale, Page, Woodward, & Salkovskis, 2015).  
Imagery rescripting has been developed for use in a number of anxiety disorders to update the 
meaning of aversive memories (Arntz, 2012). It has been proposed that addressing aversive 
images in OCD may lead to a reduction in symptoms, as measured on the Yale-Brown 
Obsessive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989). In a case series, Veale et al. 
(2015) demonstrated that, after one session of imagery rescripting targeting an aversive 
memory, there was a clinically significant improvement in OCD symptoms at three-month 
follow-up. The authors suggested that they would cautiously recommend the use of imagery 
rescripting in therapy for OCD; however, the sample was small and there was no control 
group. Nevertheless, other authors have also suggested that imagery rescripting is a 
promising future direction for psychological therapy (Holmes et al., 2016).  
In summary, it is clear that distressing imagery is common in OCD, plays an important part in 
maintenance cycles and may therefore be an important target for new interventions.  
1.5 Moral philosophy 
This literature review has so far considered guilt and imagery and the relationship of these 
constructs to OCD symptomatology. This research in relation to imagery and guilt is drawn 
from the clinical psychology literature. However, imagery and guilt have also been 
extensively researched in the moral philosophy literature. Moral concerns seem particularly 
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salient in people with OCD (e.g., Reuven et al., 2013) and this review will now consider how 
the moral philosophy literature could potentially add to our understanding of OCD.  
Guilt has often been described as a ‘moral emotion’ (Chiang, 2013) and moral emotions 
accompany, and may have a causal influence on moral judgments (Bruni, 2013). If people 
with OCD are sensitive to the experience of guilt, it is possible that moral judgments in this 
population may be qualitatively different from those made by people in the general 
population.  Considering imagery, Caruso and Gino (2011) found that when participants were 
asked to close their eyes and make moral judgments, they engaged in more mental simulation 
(or use of imagery). This greater use of mental simulation was associated with extreme moral 
judgments, as participants more frequently judged immoral behaviours as unethical.  
Before going on to consider why moral judgments might be different in people with OCD, 
this review will first provide a brief overview of the main concepts and models in the moral 
philosophy literature.  
1.5.1 Moral judgments. Many philosophers have attempted to explain the reasoning 
processes behind moral judgments in the general population. Mikhail (2009) proposed that 
moral judgments are the product of a psychological system that makes use of objective rules, 
known as the ‘universal moral grammar’. According to this model, human morality is based 
on innate, ‘absolute’ knowledge. This idea is supported by the fact that ethical systems across 
history and culture have consistent moral principles, for example ‘murder is wrong’ (Bruni, 
2013).  
However, people do not always act consistently with these absolute principles and people 
have different cultural and individual concepts of right and wrong. Morality can therefore be 
understood as relative or changeable, dependent on the circumstances. People often struggle 
to determine what is right or wrong, as principles may be in conflict (Bartels, Bauman, 
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Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 2014). Defining moral judgments as either absolute or 
relative may therefore be too simplistic.  
In the philosophy literature, moral judgments are typically classified on the intrinsic quality 
of an action (deontology) or its consequences (utilitarianism) (e.g., Bartels et al., 2014). The 
process of making a moral decision can generate cognitive conflict, as there may be a choice 
between the rights of the individual and the greater good (i.e., deontological vs. utilitarian 
decision; Amit, Gottlieb, & Greene, 2014). Typically, philosophers have argued that morality 
is one or the other, absolute or relative; however these viewpoints are clearly in conflict. 
People do not appear to be rigidly deontological or utilitarian in the moral judgments that 
they make. Consequently, a substantial body of research has attempted to account for the 
moral flexibility that people exhibit (Waldmann, Nagel, & Wiegmann, 2012). An alternative 
understanding of morality is required to account for why people sometimes follow universal 
principles and at other times choose not to do so.  
1.5.2 Dual process model. Some theorists have claimed that morality is a product of 
reasoning, whereas others argue that morality originates in intuitive mental processes (Haidt 
& Joseph, 2004). More recently, researchers have attempted to reconcile these  conflicting 
views by claiming that affective and cognitive processes jointly contribute to moral 
judgments (Greene et al., 2009; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; 
Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). According to the ‘dual-process model’, 
affective reactions are immediately elicited by moral stimuli and then these reactions are 
overridden by cognitive processing if given sufficient time, motivation and resources. The 
psychological processes involved are distinct and independent, so they can produce 
conflicting decisions in response to difficult moral dilemmas (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).  
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Where principles are in conflict, researchers have sought to understand the cognitive 
processes underlying moral judgments. Recent research has shown that when presented with 
moral dilemmas that describe inflicting harm on one person to help others, people 
involuntarily experience a negative emotional reaction to the prospect of causing harm 
(Greene et al., 2004). This negative emotional reaction facilitates automatic processing and 
means that people are more likely to make a deontological moral decision. When people are 
given time to consider their response and use their cognitive resources to weigh up their 
options, they are more likely to make a utilitarian judgment. In other words, deontological 
judgments are preferentially supported by automatic emotional processing, whilst utilitarian 
judgments are facilitated by controlled cognitive processing unfolding over time.  
There is a significant body of evidence to support the validity of this model. Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) showed that when people make 
deontological moral judgments, there is increased activation in areas of the brain linked with 
the processing of emotions. Cushman, Murray, Gordon-McKeon, Wharton, and Greene 
(2012) found that participants who demonstrated high levels of physiological and affective 
arousal were significantly more likely to make deontological moral judgments. There is clear 
evidence that a strong affective reaction predicts a greater propensity to make deontological 
moral decisions.  
Conversely, when negative affect was reduced by showing a humorous video clip, people 
made fewer deontological decisions (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). Ciaramelli, Muccioli, 
Làdavas, and di Pellegrino (2007) also found that people with damage to areas of the brain 
associated with emotional processing made fewer deontological judgments. It appears that 
when emotional processing is impaired or negative affect is reduced, people tend to make 
fewer deontological judgments. This again supports the idea that deontological judgments 
involve automatic emotional processing.  
29 
 
Regarding the second assumption of the dual-process model, when cognitive processing is 
impeded, people appear to find it more difficult to make utilitarian judgments. Greene et al. 
(2008) found that when participants were asked to perform a digit search task, alongside 
making moral decisions, their reaction time increased significantly when making utilitarian 
judgments. Suter and Hertwig (2011) showed that if participants were put under time pressure 
or distracted by other information, the frequency and speed of utilitarian choice reduced. An 
fMRI study showed that when participants were able to use controlled cognition, they more 
frequently made utilitarian judgments (Cushman et al., 2012). Carmona-Perera, Martí-García, 
Pérez-García, and Verdejo-García (2013) also found that if levels of negative emotional 
arousal remained low, participants were more likely to make utilitarian choices, possibly 
because they were less distracted and able to use controlled cognition.  
These studies all provide support for the existence of the dual-process model of morality as 
they demonstrate that emotion is associated with automatic, deontological choices and 
cognition is associated with controlled, utilitarian choices. However, Kahane et al. (2012) and 
Białek and De Neys (2016) assert that the dual-process model of morality is flawed. These 
researchers proposed that the distinction between deontological and utilitarian judgments is 
confounded by the distinction between intuitive and counterintuitive judgments. Kahane et al. 
(2012) showed that it was more difficult to make counterintuitive judgments compared with 
intuitive judgments, regardless of whether these judgments were utilitarian or deontological 
in nature. Białek and De Neys (2016) found that deontological decisions are made more 
slowly and with less confidence when people are presented with moral dilemmas that 
describe counterintuitive choices.  
1.5.3 Construal level theory. As an alternative to the dual-process model, Trope and 
Liberman (2010) put forward ‘construal level theory’ (CLT). According to CLT, information 
can be processed at a high (abstract) or low (concrete) level. Utilitarian judgments are 
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associated with high-level construals, as considering outcomes or ‘ends’ uses more abstract 
thought processes. Deontological judgments are associated with low-level construals, as 
considering immediate harm or ‘means’ uses concrete thought processes. In an experimental 
study, Körner and Volk (2014) linked these ideas with the dual-process model and proposed 
that information can be processed abstractly or concretely according to its ‘psychological 
distance’. Concrete or vivid information about means caused emotional arousal and led to 
that people making more deontological judgments, whereas abstract information about ends 
was more difficult to conceptualise and led to people making more utilitarian judgments.  
1.5.4 Moral principles. Building on the research into models of understanding 
morality (described above), moral psychology researchers have also sought to understand the 
cognitive processes that underlie moral decisions, in order to clarify general ‘moral 
principles’ that people are inclined to follow.  
In a study with a non-clinical population, Greene et al. (2001) showed that participants had a 
stronger emotional reaction (therefore made more deontological decisions) when asked to 
choose a course of action that included personal contact with a potential victim. Similarly, 
Greene et al. (2009) demonstrated that people judge harmful actions as less morally 
acceptable when they involve the use of an agent’s muscles and body. ‘Personal’ moral 
dilemmas elicited increased activity in brain regions that have been associated with emotion 
and social cognition (Greene et al., 2004, 2001). However, these data are correlational and 
cannot demonstrate a causal relationship between an emotional response and different moral 
judgments.  
In another non-clinical study, Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) investigated three 
principles of moral judgment that have been tested numerous times by moral philosophers: 
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(1) The ‘action principle’ – harm caused as a direct result of an action is morally worse 
than harm as a result of inaction. 
(2) The ‘intention principle’ – harm caused deliberately is morally worse than harm that 
occurs as the side-effect of an action.  
(3) The ‘contact principle’ – harm caused by physical contact with a victim is morally 
worse than harm that occurs without personally touching somebody.  
Cushman et al. (2006) found that all of these proposed moral principles were upheld in their 
non-clinical sample.  
The three moral principles described in Cushman et al. (2006), and the ‘personal’ moral 
principle described by Greene et al. (2009) have been proposed by moral psychology 
researchers who sought to build on theories found in the experimental philosophy literature. 
Predominantly, this moral psychology research has been conducted with non-clinical 
populations as it aimed to develop our overall understanding of morality and decision-
making. However, these moral principles may also have implications for understanding 
decision-making processes in clinical populations. Investigating the potential differences in 
moral reasoning between non-clinical and clinical populations would provide new 
information which could contribute to models of morality, as well as our understanding of 
psychopathology.  
1.6 Moral principles in OCD 
There is a growing body of evidence that moral judgments and principles may be 
qualitatively different in clinical populations (Moran et al., 2011; Young et al., 2010; Young, 
Koenigs, Kruepke, & Newman, 2012). Individuals with OCD may make different moral 
judgments due to the high levels of moral emotion and morally relevant cognitive biases 
involved in the disorder. This is an area that warrants further investigation, as to date there 
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has been limited research. This review will first summarise the limited research into moral 
judgments in OCD, which has focused on the ‘omission bias’ and deontological/utilitarian 
decision making. It will then continue to consider how a specific moral principle (the 
‘intention bias’) could be relevant to understanding different beliefs and cognitions in people 
with OCD.    
1.6.1 Omission and OCD. In a non-clinical study looking at how moral judgments 
might be related to OCD symptomatology, Siev, Huppert, and Chambless (2010) found that 
symptoms of OCD were negatively associated with the ‘omission bias’ (the idea that harm as 
the result of inaction is more morally acceptable than harm as the result of an action). In other 
words, people with higher levels of OCD symptomatology were less likely to demonstrate an 
‘omission bias’. These participants judged harm resulting from both action and inaction as 
equally morally unacceptable. However, this was only the case when the dilemmas presented 
were relevant to typical OCD concerns (e.g., washing and checking scenarios). This 
replicated the findings of a similar earlier study conducted by Wroe and Salkovskis (2000). 
Taken together, these studies provide support for the idea that people with OCD make 
different moral decisions, but only when these decisions are related to OCD-specific 
concerns. 
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1.6.2 Utilitarian and deontological decision making in OCD.  Moral decision 
making has been investigated in participants with OCD compared with control participants. 
Franklin et al. (2009) found that participants who reported strongly endorsing responsibility 
attitudes were less likely to make utilitarian decisions. However, whilst there was a trend in 
the direction of this prediction, there were no significant differences in the moral decisions 
made by the OCD and control groups. The authors concluded that there was no general 
deficit or difference in moral reasoning in people with OCD compared with control 
participants. They suggested that further research was required to explore whether potential 
differences in moral reasoning are restricted to specific domains.  
In a more recent study, Whitton, Henry, and Grisham (2014) investigated whether there were 
differences in utilitarian moral reasoning, inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility and disgust 
in participants with a diagnosis of OCD, participants who met criteria for an anxiety disorder 
and a non-clinical control group. The three-group design is a strength compared with other 
research into moral reasoning which has typically included only an OCD and a control group, 
however it should be noted that the sample size was small. The authors found that people 
with OCD less frequently chose a utilitarian action compared with non-clinical controls, 
however there was no difference in moral reasoning between people with OCD and those 
with another anxiety disorder. In this study, Whitton et al. (2014) presented participants with 
‘benign’, ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ dilemmas and the difference in frequency of utilitarian 
decisions between people with OCD and non-clinical controls was only found in the case of 
‘impersonal’ dilemmas. In line with the Franklin et al. (2009) study, it could therefore be the 
case that differences in moral reasoning in OCD are confined to specific domains.  
As is clear from the above studies, the moral decisions made by individuals with OCD appear 
to differ compared to nonclinical individuals. However, these potential distinctions have yet 
to be fully explored and understood. Differences in moral reasoning in OCD may be specific 
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to the subject of people’s obsessions, or particular moral principles may be more or less likely 
to be upheld in this population.  
1.6.3 Intent and OCD. A moral principle that has been well-documented in the 
philosophy literature is the ‘intention bias’, as previously mentioned in Cushman et al. 
(2006). According to the ‘intention bias’ or ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ as it is known in 
philosophy (Foot, 1967), causing harm is justifiable if this harm is an inevitable result of an 
intentional action carried out with a good outcome in mind. In other words, harm that is a 
side-effect of an action carried out with good intentions is more morally acceptable than harm 
resulting directly from an action. Hauser et al. (2007) proposed that the intention principle 
exists universally and is part of people’s ‘moral competence’. However, Cushman et al. 
(2006) found that people were not consciously aware of the intention principle. Participants 
in their study rated scenarios describing harm as a side-effect of an action as more acceptable 
than intentional harm, but they were not able to justify their decisions. The intention principle 
may therefore be an unconscious bias, implying that these moral judgments are intuitive.  
A number of researchers have found that a stronger emotional response is generated when 
people are presented with a scenario describing intentional harm compared with harm as a 
side-effect of an action (e.g., Decety & Cacioppo, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2008; Russell & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2011). Miller and Cushman (2013) proposed that this difference in emotional 
intensity depends on the perceived intent of the perpetrator. If people believe that someone 
intends to bring about harm, they are judged as more responsible and culpable for their 
actions. However, Knobe (2006) found that this culpability only holds true in the case of a 
negative outcome from an action. If someone carries out an action which results in a positive 
side-effect, people are less likely to believe that they intended this to happen.  
35 
 
This raises questions about the idea of ‘agency’, which has been proposed as a 
concept that may be defined differently in mental health conditions and in OCD in particular 
(Oren, Friedmann, & Dar, 2016). ‘Agency’ has been defined as “the exercise of the capacity 
to perform intentional actions” (Schlosser, 2015, p. 1). In OCD, people may have a different 
understanding of intent due to ‘thought-action fusion’ (e.g., Shafran, Thordarson, et al., 
1996), where people believe they are responsible for causing potential harm to themselves or 
others just by thinking about this harm (Salkovskis, 1996). An intrusive thought about harm 
is viewed as morally equivalent to harm that happens in reality.  
In OCD, it could be argued that people foresee harm when they have intrusive thoughts or 
images. From an ethical point of view, “premeditation (being able to foresee harmful 
outcomes) usually makes an objectionable act seem more culpable” (Gregory and Zangwill, 
1987, p. 681). In other words, foreseeing harm means that people are viewed as more 
responsible or blameworthy for their actions. This has interesting implications for people 
with OCD, who have frequent distressing intrusive thoughts and images of harm or 
objectionable acts occurring. However, for people with OCD, their intrusive thoughts are 
‘ego-dystonic’ which means that harm is not a desired outcome.  
If harm is not a desired outcome for someone, it seems relevant to consider whether they can 
be judged responsible or blamed for their actions. Malle, Guglielmo, and Monroe (2014) 
proposed that a person can be judged as blameworthy if (1) they are directly causally 
responsible and (2) they intended to cause harm. These judgments of blame, causality and 
intentionality become much more difficult in the case of accidental or attempted harm 
(Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007).  
Malle et al. (2014) proposed that an action can be judged as intentional if a person can be 
judged to have the desire, belief, intention, skill and awareness to carry it out. Cushman 
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(2008) found that when people make judgments about blame, they consider someone’s 
beliefs about causing harm and their desire to cause harm as the most important factors. This 
has implications for people with OCD, who clearly have an exaggerated belief that they have 
the ability to cause harm. Whether harm can be viewed as intentional or not in people with 
OCD seems difficult to clearly understand.  
Cushman (2015) stated that an act can be understood as intentional if people have a ‘plan’, 
where actions can be linked to outcomes. A ‘plan’ is a mental state representation of an 
action that will be performed to achieve a goal. People with intrusive thoughts and images 
may well hold in mind a harmful outcome, but their intention is usually to prevent this from 
happening. If a person causes harm unintentionally, it becomes relevant to ask whether a 
person had the ‘obligation’ or the ‘capacity’ to have prevented harm (Malle et al., 2014). 
Again, people with OCD may have skewed views on this due to high levels of perceived 
responsibility and a fear of guilt. Unintentional harm may therefore be just as morally 
objectionable as intentional harm for people with OCD.  
There is some evidence that the ‘intention bias’ is not as prevalent in clinical populations. 
Moran et al. (2011) found that people with autism do not demonstrate an intention bias in 
their moral judgments. This finding was partly attributed to cognitive inflexibility. It has been 
proposed that people with OCD also have high levels of cognitive inflexibility (Gruner, 
Anticevic, Lee, & Pittenger, 2016; Whitton et al., 2014), as they may be more rigid in their 
thinking style and less responsive to situational changes (Soref, Dar, Argov, & Meiran, 
2008).  
Cognitive inflexibility may mean that people find it difficult to make decisions and 
accordingly, OCD has been thought of as a ‘decision-making disorder’. Erhan and Balcı 
(2016) found that higher scores on measures of OCD symptomatology predict more cautious 
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decision-making. In this study, people with higher levels of OCD symptomatology displayed 
more rumination, checking and precision-seeking behaviour. People with OCD typically 
gather more information during the process of making a decision and show high levels of 
intolerance of uncertainty (Sip, Muratore, & Stern, 2016).   
The factors that influence moral decision-making in OCD could potentially provide valuable 
information regarding cognitive or behavioural treatment targets (Sip et al., 2016). Moral 
concerns such as responsibility, state-guilt, trait-guilt and a fear of deontological guilt have 
all been suggested as important components of maintenance cycles in OCD. The ‘intention 
bias’ seems particularly relevant to people with OCD, who often judge themselves harshly in 
terms of guilt and responsibility for harm.  Understanding how people with OCD make moral 
decisions may help with understanding the aetiology of the disorder, however there is a lack 
of research applying what is known about moral judgments to a clinical population (Franklin 
et al., 2009).  
1.6.4 Imagery, morality and OCD. As mentioned previously, imagery has been 
strongly implicated in the development of OCD symptomatology (e.g.,  Speckens et al., 
2007). Imagery has also been an important line of research in the moral philosophy literature.  
Amit and Greene (2012) have proposed that the dual-process model of morality is supported 
by evidence that deontological judgments are preferentially supported by visual processing, 
whereas utilitarian judgments are preferentially supported by verbal processing. In other 
words, if people visualise potential harm, they are more likely to make a deontological choice 
to avoid intentionally inflicting harm. Similarly, Miller and Cushman (2013) found that an 
emotional response to intentional harm is linked with consideration of the suffering a victim 
will have to endure. If people imagine suffering or harm in vivid detail they experience high 
levels of emotional arousal (Bartels, 2008).  
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In OCD, people experience distressing images of potentially negative outcomes which are 
likely to lead to intense emotions such as guilt, fear and shame, in turn affecting the moral 
decisions that people make. Linking this with the findings from the moral philosophy 
literature that high levels of emotional arousal lead to more extreme moral judgments (see 
section 1.5.2), it follows that people with OCD might make qualitatively different moral 
decisions from those in the general population. If this is the case, cognitions, emotions and 
beliefs about morality resulting from distressing imagery may be important future treatment 
targets. 
In summary, there is evidence that there are differences in the moral judgments made by 
clinical and non-clinical populations (e.g., Young et al., 2012). Moral judgments in people 
with OCD have been investigated with reference to the omission bias (Wroe & Salkovskis, 
2000), however other well-known moral principles have not yet been researched in this 
population. The current study aimed to add to the literature on moral judgments in people 
with OCD by focusing on the intention bias. It is hoped that investigating this moral principle 
in people with OCD (in addition to the morally relevant constructs guilt and imagery) could 
contribute to our understanding of this complex disorder.  
1.7 Measurement issues 
This chapter will now consider some important methodological issues relating to the 
constructs in this study, before concluding with a brief summary of the literature review and 
the study hypotheses.  
1.7.1 Imagery. Given the link between imagery and levels of emotional arousal in 
mental health difficulties, several researchers have sought to measure how people use 
imagery. However, this has proved difficult, as the use of imagery is an inherently private act 
(Pearson et al., 2015).  
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Several researchers have developed self-report scales, for example, the Spontaneous Use of 
Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). The SUIS consists of twelve 
items, which ask respondents to rate how often they engage in visual imagery in their 
everyday activities. More recently, the Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire has been 
developed, which asks participants to rate their image on a seven-point scale anchored by ‘no 
image at all’ (0) and ‘as vivid as real life’ (7) (Psi-Q; Baugh, Ganis, Deeprose, May, & 
Andrade, 2014). Both of these scales show good internal reliability: Psi-Q = .97, SUIS = .74. 
However, researchers have drawn a distinction between the emotional content of imagery and 
verbal thoughts and measuring imagery alone does not facilitate this distinction (Holmes, 
Mathews, et al., 2008).  
In one of the first studies comparing visual and verbal processing, Vrana, Cuthbert, and Lang 
(1986) asked a non-clinical sample to imagine or silently repeat sentences which were 
classified as fearful or neutral. They found higher levels of emotional arousal when 
participants imagined the fearful scenarios as opposed to verbally repeating descriptions. 
However, the sentences were presented initially in an auditory format, so participants were 
always presented with verbal information first. The greater emotional impact of the imagery 
condition could reflect the fact that the information is presented in two modalities rather than 
one (Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & Holmes, 2015).  
To address this methodological problem, (Holmes, Mathews, et al., 2008) devised the 
Picture-Word Task (PWT). Participants were presented with a picture and word 
simultaneously and asked to combine the stimuli by creating a verbal representation or 
mental image. They were then asked to rate on a nine-point Likert scale how visual or verbal 
their representation was, and how emotional they found it. Holmes, Mathews, et al. (2008) 
found that higher ratings of emotion were significantly positively correlated with the use of 
visual processing strategies but not with the use of verbal processing strategies. Apart from 
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this study, there has been limited research into how visual and verbal processing may 
differentially affect emotional arousal; however a recent study supports the hypothesis that 
mental imagery elicits strong emotion (Pearson et al., 2015). The level of emotional response 
experienced during imagery is related to how vividly an individual can generate mental 
imagery in general (Ji et al., 2015). 
1.7.2 Moral dilemmas. Historically, research into morality has been considered more 
relevant to philosophy than psychology. However, moral dilemmas are increasingly being 
used as a tool in experimental psychology to study the processes underlying moral judgments 
and to develop a paradigm for experimentally induced ‘cognitive conflict’ (e.g., Greene et al., 
2001). Typically, these dilemmas present a situation detailing harm to one or more 
individuals and people are asked to choose an appropriate course of action. Moral dilemmas 
combined with methods from cognitive neuroscience have helped to provide insight into the 
psychological processes involved in making moral decisions (Cushman & Greene, 2012).  
There is an ongoing debate about whether it is valid to use moral dilemmas to study the 
process of making a moral judgment. Asking people to consider a hypothetical situation can 
be problematic, as people’s ideas about how they would act might be very different from how 
they would act in reality (Aguilar, Brussino, & Fernández-Dols, 2013). It may also be 
difficult for people to refrain from including information or knowledge from outside of the 
scenario in their decisions (Bartels et al., 2014). Some researchers found that moral dilemmas 
were not a useful research tool in people with high levels of psychopathy (Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011; Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014). Most moral dilemmas used in this type 
of research focus only on the moral concern of physical harm. These moral dilemmas are 
colloquially known as ‘trolley problems’ (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  
41 
 
Cushman and Greene (2012) argue there is no suggestion that people’s responses to moral 
dilemmas can predict their actual behaviour. Nevertheless, these moral dilemmas can provide 
an insight into people’s underlying cognitive processes. By providing people with extreme 
moral dilemmas, it may be possible to draw more reliable conclusions about how moral 
judgments are made, as any underlying processes or cognitions are likely to be exaggerated 
(Christensen & Gomila, 2012). Presenting an individual with a moral dilemma results in 
emotional arousal, which is thought to play a part in the process of making moral decisions 
(Moll et al., 2002). If moral dilemmas provide insight into people’s cognitive processes or 
emotional reactions when making moral decisions, they are certainly a useful research tool.  
Moral dilemmas in research have increasingly been conceptualised as experimental stimuli 
that allow the inclusion of many variables. It is therefore important to consider confounding 
variables that need to be controlled for in the current study. As an example, previous research 
has taken into account the length of moral dilemmas, time allowed to read them, participant 
perspective (i.e., observer vs. protagonist) and language used (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). 
If the content of moral dilemmas is controlled, researchers can devise vignettes to test 
specific moral principles. This would allow inferences to be drawn about normative models 
of moral decision-making. As moral dilemmas are valid research tools and can provide useful 
information about moral reasoning processes in non-clinical populations, it is possible to use 
them to conduct research into clinical populations and consider potential differences in moral 
reasoning (Bartels et al., 2014). It was therefore considered appropriate to use moral 
dilemmas as a research tool in the current study. 
In addition to the general validity of moral dilemmas as a research tool, it is also important to 
consider the content of the vignettes themselves (i.e., general or specific to OCD-like 
concerns). To date, standard moral dilemmas have been used in a number of studies that 
consider moral reasoning in OCD (Franklin et al., 2009; Mancini & Gangemi, 2015; Whitton 
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et al., 2014). Generally, researchers have used vignettes that “resemble dilemmas… discussed 
by contemporary moral philosophers” (Whitton et al., 2014, p. 155) and these vignettes have 
not been OCD-specific. Contrary to this, Franklin et al. (2009) and Wroe and Salkovskis 
(2000) both suggested that differences in moral reasoning might only be found when people 
with OCD are presented with scenarios that address their obsessional concerns. However, 
Whitton et al. (2014) and Mancini and Gangemi (2015) both found differences in moral 
reasoning in people with OCD using general moral reasoning vignettes.  
Considering the use of OCD-specific vignettes, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) designed moral 
dilemmas to test the ‘omission bias’ which were ‘OCD-relevant’ as they described concerns 
similar to typical obsessional concerns (e.g., contamination). These moral dilemmas were 
rated by the researchers as more or less relevant to participants’ obsessional concerns, 
dependent on participants’ ratings of how disturbed they were by any given dilemmas. 
However, it is important to note that whilst these moral dilemmas were ‘OCD-relevant’ they 
were not specifically designed for each individual participant and so could not address 
idiosyncratic concerns. Also, whilst Franklin et al. (2009) suggested that differences in moral 
reasoning might be limited to specific domains in people with OCD, this suggestion may 
have been a result of ambiguous findings as their study used a small sample and may have 
been statistically underpowered. Each of these studies have researched subtly different areas 
of moral reasoning (the omission bias and deontological vs. utilitarian reasoning respectively) 
from the current study which investigated the intention bias.  
To summarise, there are mixed findings in the literature; some researchers have found 
meaningful differences in moral reasoning using general moral dilemmas (Whitton et al., 
2014), some found differences using OCD-specific dilemmas (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000) and 
others suggested that differences might be found when using OCD-specific dilemmas 
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(Franklin et al., 2009). The studies that have suggested the use of OCD-specific vignettes 
have been small with mixed findings and may have been underpowered.  
As the current study is the first to investigate the intention bias in OCD, vignettes which have 
previously been used to investigate the intention bias (Cushman et al., 2006 – see section 
2.3.5) were selected. The use of these general ‘intention’ vignettes meant that the intention 
bias could be tested in a direct replication of previous research. Conceptually, it would be 
difficult to design vignettes to test the intention bias which would also adequately address 
specific OCD concerns. In a previous DClinPsy project, designing OCD-specific vignettes to 
test utilitarian and deontological reasoning was not deemed feasible (Trafford, 2016). Also, 
using new OCD-specific vignettes would mean that the findings of the current study could 
not be compared with existing non-clinical research into the intention bias. It could be argued 
that to some extent all moral dilemmas are ‘OCD-relevant’ as they describe potential harm 
which can be prevented. For these reasons, the general moral reasoning vignettes previously 
used by Cushman et al. (2006) to investigate the intention bias were used in this study.  
1.8 Summary 
It is clear from the literature that the moral decisions people with OCD make are different 
from those in the general population (Jacobsen, Freeman, & Salkovskis, 2012; Wroe & 
Salkovskis, 2000), however it may be the case that these differences are confined to specific 
domains (Franklin et al., 2009). The intention bias was selected as a moral principle of 
interest as this seems particularly relevant to people with OCD. They seem to have a different 
understanding of causality due to an inflated sense of responsibility, fear of guilt and 
‘thought-action fusion’ cognitive biases (Salkovskis, 1996; Shafran et al., 1996).  
People with OCD frequently experience intrusive imagery (Holmes & Mathews, 2005) and it 
has been shown that compared with verbal intrusions, imagery generates more intense 
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emotional arousal (Holmes, Mathews, et al., 2008). This may be linked with the heightened 
experience of distress and guilt found in people with OCD (e.g., D’Olimpio et al., 2013).  
However, the research to date on guilt and OCD is mixed and there are vastly different 
definitions of guilt. Some researchers propose that trait guilt (stable and enduring) is an 
important predictor of clinical obsessions (e.g., Shafran, Watkins, & Charman, 1996). Others 
argue that the combination of high levels of state (time-dependent) and trait guilt is associated 
with the increased threat perception found in people with OCD (e.g., Gangemi et al., 2007). It 
is apparent that there is a relationship between the experience of guilt and OCD symptoms; 
however, the details of this link remain unclear. It seems likely that the heightened experience 
of imagery and emotional arousal found in OCD may be linked in some way with the 
experience of guilt.  
The current study aimed to integrate the diverse areas of research described above, to 
contribute to the developing literature on morally relevant constructs in OCD. Current 
cognitive models of OCD (e.g., Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997) 
propose that beliefs regarding the nature and importance of thoughts affect how intrusive 
thoughts and images are appraised by an individual. TAF (Shafran, Thordarson, et al., 1996) 
could mean that people with OCD interpret having a ‘bad’ thought as morally equivalent to 
harm that occurs in reality. It has been suggested that people with OCD are more sensitive to 
moral concerns than the general population (Melli, Carraresi, Poli, Marazziti, & Pinto, 2017). 
This heightened moral sensitivity could be related to cognitive biases such as TAF, or could 
also be attributed to the nature of intrusions in people with OCD and how they respond to 
them. It is well documented that people with OCD experience intrusions in the form of 
distressing imagery, which elicits a strong emotional response (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). 
Researchers have shown that imagery is associated with high levels of emotional arousal 
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which leads to automatic, deontological moral judgments (Amit & Greene, 2012). Negative 
emotions such as guilt are key maintaining factors in OCD (Shapiro & Stewart, 2011) and 
could be linked with altered moral reasoning processes, particularly if people with OCD are 
sensitive to the experience of guilt.  
In summary, people with OCD demonstrate cognitive biases which could affect their 
understanding of morality. The experience of distressing imagery in OCD could also affect 
moral judgments due to high levels of emotional arousal (e.g., guilt). This study will aim to 
investigate how people with different levels of OC respond to moral stimuli, and whether OC 
is related to imagery and guilt. Both imagery and guilt have been implicated in processes of 
moral reasoning: this study will examine whether moral reasoning processes are qualitatively 
different in people with high levels of OC, before going on to consider constructs (imagery 
and guilt) that could account for this potential difference.  
1.8.1 Study outline. This study aimed to explore processes of moral reasoning, moral 
emotions and imagery in people who are high and low in obsessive-compulsiveness 
(high/low OC). Participants were asked to complete an online survey consisting of 
questionnaires about mood, demographic information, OCD symptoms, guilt and cognitive 
style (visual vs. verbal). These participants were recruited from a non-clinical sample 
(students, social media and mental health charity forums). As OCD symptomatology is on a 
spectrum, it is justifiable to investigate novel individual differences in a non-clinical 
population to identify whether research with a clinical sample is warranted (Abramowitz et 
al., 2014). The study aimed to recruit at least 140 participants, half of which would meet the 
clinical cut-off for a diagnosis of OCD (a score of 21 on the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
– Revised; Foa et al., 2002) and half of which fall below this cut-off.  
1.8.2 Study hypotheses. The hypotheses for the study were as follows: 
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(1) ‘People in the low-OC group will demonstrate an intention bias, people in the high-
OC group will not do so.’ 
(2) ‘More frequent use of imagery will be associated with higher levels of OCD 
symptomatology, distress and guilt.’ 
(3) ‘State and trait guilt will mediate the relationship between imagery and OCD 
symptomatology.’ 
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2 Method 
This chapter sets out the characteristics of the sample, exclusion criteria and recruitment 
strategy, followed by a justification and description of the measures used. It goes on to 
describe the piloting procedure, full study procedure and pertinent ethical considerations.  
2.1 Sample 
221 participants completed an online survey between August 2016 and January 2017 (159 
females, 39 males, three selected ‘other’ - defining themselves as ‘gender-queer or non-
binary’ and four chose ‘prefer not to say’). The minimum age of the initial sample was 16 
years and the maximum age was 65 (M = 25.37, SD = 8.82).  
318 participants started the survey but did not complete it, giving an attrition rate of 59% 
(total number of participants who started the survey was 539). The progression of participants 
through the survey and implications of this high drop-out rate will be examined in further 
detail later in this chapter and in the discussion.  
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2.1.1  Exclusion criteria.  Participants were not included in analyses if they were 
less than 18 years of age as the ability to make moral judgments varies considerably at 
different stages of development (e.g., Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Those completing the 
questionnaire were also asked to confirm they had a competent understanding of English as 
Christensen and Gomila (2012) state that it is necessary for participants responding to moral 
dilemmas to have a good conceptual understanding of the language the dilemmas are 
presented in. Finally, participants’ responses to the moral dilemmas were checked; if they 
gave a nonsensical or unethical response their data were removed from the analyses (see 
Chapter 3). After applying these criteria, sixteen participants were removed from analyses (3 
were below the age of 18, 13 gave strange responses to the moral dilemmas). All participants 
stated that they had a good working knowledge of the English language.  
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2.1.2  High-OC group. Previous research has shown that a cut-off score of 21 on 
the OCI-R is appropriate for differentiating between people with OCD symptoms and 
controls (Foa et al., 2002). For this reason, participants scoring 21 and over on the OCI-R 
were allocated to the ‘high-OC’ group. 72 participants met criteria for inclusion in the ‘high-
OC’ group (52 females, 16 males, 3 ‘other’ and 1 selected ‘prefer not to say’). Participants’ 
age ranged from 18 to 50 years (M = 23.07, SD = 5.70).  
2.1.3 Low-OC group. To be included in the ‘low-OC’ group, participants were 
required to score 20 or lower on the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002). 133 participants met this 
criterion (107 females, 23 males and 3 who selected ‘prefer not to say’). Participants’ age 
ranged from 18 to 65 years (M = 26.78, SD = 9.87).  
2.1.4 Power analysis. The original study investigating the intention principle 
conducted by Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) used similar methodology to that in the 
current study. In Cushman et al. (2006), participants were presented with vignette pairs 
detailing intentional harm vs. harm as a side-effect and paired sample t-tests were performed 
to determine whether subjects rated one scenario in the pair significantly more permissible 
than the other. Cushman et al. (2006) found statistically significant differences in all pairs and 
a small effect size (d = .28). 
Using this small effect size (d =.30) as a guide, the recommended sample size for each group 
for a power level of .80 and an α of .05 is 70 (140 participants in total, 70 meeting criteria for 
the ‘high-OC’ group and 70 meeting criteria for the ‘low-OC’ group) in order to conduct a 
paired-samples t-test in line with Hypothesis 1 (Cohen, 1992a). Hypothesis 1 proposed that 
participants classified as ‘high-OC’ would not demonstrate an intention bias whereas those in 
the ‘low-OC’ group would demonstrate an intention bias (i.e., intentional harm would be 
judged as less acceptable than harm as a side-effect of an action).  
50 
 
In order to recruit 70 participants who met the criteria for the ‘high-OC’ group, recruitment 
continued beyond the target number of 140. To obtain the required number of participants 
scoring 21 or over on the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002), 221 participants (who finished the survey) 
were recruited.  
2.2 Recruitment 
2.2.1 Recruitment strategy. To achieve the target sample size, participants were 
recruited from a number of different sources. These included the Royal Holloway participant 
pools (credit and prize draw), social media (Facebook, Twitter, Reddit), mental health 
websites (OCD-Action: http://www.ocdaction.org.uk/help-us/research and Student Minds: 
http://www.studentminds.org.uk/research-studies.html) and a website where researchers from 
a range of disciplines can advertise for participants (https://www.callforparticipants.com). All 
participants chose to take part voluntarily after viewing a brief description of the study (see 
Appendix A for an example).  
To recruit participants via social media channels, careful consideration was given to guidance 
on the use of social media by clinical psychologists. This guidance recommends that 
practitioners maintain separate profiles for their professional and personal lives and clearly 
state the purpose of any professional pages designed for engagement with service users (BPS, 
2012).  As such, social media accounts dedicated to research recruitment were created on 
Facebook, Twitter and Reddit (for example screenshot see Appendix B). The BPS (2012) 
guidelines state that it is important to obtain appropriate permissions to post on public 
websites. On the Reddit website, the study was shared on the ‘Sample Size’ thread where 
researchers are permitted to post advertisements for research. In addition, the study was 
posted on the ‘OCD’ thread after permission was obtained from the moderator.  
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2.2.2 Incentives. Psychology undergraduates recruited from the Royal Holloway 
University participant pool received 3 course credits which were granted automatically by the 
system on survey completion. All other participants were invited to enter a prize draw to win 
one of four £25 Amazon vouchers by entering their email address at the end of the survey. 
Entry into the prize draw was optional so that participants were not required to provide their 
email address. 
2.2.3 Sample drop-out. In a previous thesis study which used similar online 
methodology to investigate imagery in OCD, there was a high rate of attrition (45.72%; 
Trafford, 2016). In the current study, 539 participants started the survey, of which 221 
completed it. Sixteen of these participants met the exclusion criteria and their data was 
subsequently excluded from analysis (N = 205). This meant that overall, there was an 
attrition rate of 59.6%. A review paper found that the drop-out from internet-based studies 
ranges from 2 to 83% (M = 31%; Melville, Casey, & Kavanagh, 2010) meaning that the 
attrition in this study was particularly high. Of note, the majority of participants dropped out 
during the initial information, consent and demographic questionnaire pages, or during the 
Picture-Word task later on in the survey. See Figure 2.1 (below) for an overview of the points 
at which participants discontinued the survey. These findings will be considered in more 
detail in the discussion chapter.  
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Figure 2.1. Participant attrition. 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Demographic information. At the start of the study, participants were asked 
to complete a self-report questionnaire, which asked them to describe their gender, age, 
ethnicity, highest level of academic qualification achieved, religion, marital status and first 
language spoken (see Appendix C). They were given the option to answer ‘prefer not to say’ 
for any or all of these questions.  
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2.3.2 Measure of obsessive-compulsiveness. To accurately diagnose OCD, 
Antony, Orsillo, and Roemer (2002) advocate the use of a structured clinical interview such 
as the SCID-IV (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) however as this study was web-
based, it was not possible to conduct a clinical interview. A web-based methodology was 
selected as this had the potential to increase the sample size due to ease of access for 
participants. Researchers are increasingly recognising the utility of online studies and have 
found in a number of cases that results are comparable with those obtained from traditional 
methods (e.g,. Baron & Siepmann, 2000; Kraut et al., 2004). For these reasons, this study 
used a self-report questionnaire to measure OCD symptoms.  
Widely used self-report measures of OCD include the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977), Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale – 
Self-Report version (Y-BOCS-SR; Baer, 1991) and  Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-
Revised version (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Abramowitz and Deacon (2006) found that the 
OCI-R assesses distress in relation to a broad range of symptoms, making it superior to the 
MOCI which does not include items measuring hoarding, ordering or symmetry.  
The clinician-administered Y-BOCS was originally developed to measure severity of OCD 
symptoms rather than as a diagnostic tool (Goodman et al., 1989). The self-report version 
was developed to reduce the time and cost involved in assessing OCD symptoms (Baer, 
1991), however it remains considerably longer than the OCI-R, at 68 items rather than 18. As 
the current study requires participants to complete a number of other measures, a shorter 
measure was considered an advantage.  
The OCI-R has been validated in a non-clinical population and has demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency (α = .88), good test-retest reliability (.70) and good convergent and 
divergent validity with other measures of anxiety and depression (Hajcak, Huppert, Simons, 
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& Foa, 2004). In a clinical population, the OCI-R has shown good internal consistency (α = 
.84), convergent and discriminant validity (Huppert et al., 2007). It was originally used with a 
mixed sample of patients with OCD, other anxiety disorders, and non-anxious controls (Foa 
et al., 2002). As it demonstrates good psychometric properties across different samples and is 
a brief screening tool, the OCI-R was selected as an appropriate measure.  
The OCI-R (see Appendix D) is an 18-item self-report questionnaire which asks participants 
to describe the extent to which symptoms of OCD have bothered them in the past month. 
They are required to rate their distress on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Not at all) 
to 4 (Extremely). The possible range of scores is 0-72 with the mean score for someone with 
OCD 28.0 (SD = 13.53). A score of 21 or above is recommended as an indication of the 
presence of OCD (Foa et al., 2002).  
Responsibility beliefs 
In previous research (Franklin et al., 2009), responsibility beliefs have been linked with 
altered moral reasoning. Franklin et al. (2009) found that people with OCD scored 
significantly higher than the control group on the Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RAS; 
Salkovskis et al., 2000). Within the OCD group, there was a significant negative association 
between responsibility attitudes and utilitarian decisions: the more strongly people in the 
OCD group endorsed responsibility attitudes, the less likely they were to make a utilitarian 
decision. There was a similar pattern in the control group, however the association was not 
significant. This study showed that responsibility attitudes were associated with altered moral 
decision-making but only in clinical participants who were presented with a deontological vs. 
utilitarian choice. The Franklin et al. (2009) study was one of the first studies to investigate 
moral reasoning in OCD (in addition to Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000) and it remains unclear 
whether responsibility beliefs can be explicitly linked to general differences in moral 
55 
 
reasoning. As there is currently no definitive link between responsibility beliefs and altered 
moral-decision making, a measure of responsibility beliefs was not included in the current 
study. The possible implications of this will be considered further in the discussion section. 
2.3.3 Measure of mood. As anxiety and depression have been shown to affect 
information processing and therefore decision-making, it was considered important to include 
a measure of mood in the current study. Beuke, Fischer, and McDowall (2003) assert that all 
research with a focus on negative emotion should measure both anxiety and depression, even 
if they are not the primary variables of interest.  
There is considerable comorbidity between OCD, depression and other anxiety disorders 
(Adam, Meinlschmidt, Gloster, & Lieb, 2012). For example, Denys, Tenney, vanMegen, de 
Geus, and Westenberg (2004) found that major depressive disorder is up to ten times more 
prevalent in people with OCD than in the general population. In the case of anxiety disorders, 
it has been suggested that there is considerable conceptual overlap between generalised 
anxiety disorder and OCD in particular, as intrusive ‘worrying thoughts’ and compensatory 
behaviours function similarly to obsessions and subsequent compulsions (Comer, Kendall, 
Franklin, Hudson, & Pimentel, 2004).  
The literature indicates that some of the outcome variables measured in this study (moral 
acceptability and imagery) may be influenced by levels of anxiety and depression, as well as 
OCD symptomatology. In a review paper, Holmes and Mathews (2010) stated that negative 
imagery is an important clinical feature of depression and anxiety disorders, in addition to 
OCD. Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) also noted that people make different moral decisions 
as a result of positive mood induction. For these reasons, it was important to include a 
measure of anxiety and depression in addition to OCD symptoms.  
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The HADS was originally developed by Zigmond and Snaith (1983; see Appendix E). It 
consists of 14 items and is divided into two subscales, anxiety (HADS-A) and depression 
(HADS-D). The questionnaire alternates between questions relating to depression and 
anxiety. Participants are asked to rate each item on a scale between 0 and 3, where a higher 
value indicates greater severity of symptoms. A cut-off of 11 on the HADS-A and HADS-D 
scales indicates clinical caseness (Crawford, Henry, Crombie, & Taylor, 2001). The HADS 
has been used extensively in clinical practice; Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, and Neckelmann (2002) 
note that before the year 2000, 747 research papers had documented its use.  
According to Bjelland et al. (2002), Cronbach’s alpha for internal consistency varies from .68 
to .93 (M = .83) for the HADS-A scale and from .67 to .90 for the HADS-D scale (M = .82). 
Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) state that a self-report instrument should have an alpha value 
of at least .60 to be judged reliable.  
Previous research has shown that there is a moderate to strong correlation between the 
HADS-A and HADS-D subscales (.49 - .74; Mykletun et al., 2001). This is consistent with 
clinical evidence that depression and anxiety are highly co-morbid (Coplan, 2015). When 
examining concurrent validity, Bjelland et al. (2002) found that correlations between the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and 
HADS-D were from .62 to .73, BDI and HADS-A from .61 to .83, and BDI and HADS-total 
scale (HADS-T) were .73. Correlations between the Clinical Anxiety Scale (Snaith, Baugh, 
Clayden, Husain, & Sipple, 1982) and HADS-A ranged between .69 and .75 (Bjelland et al., 
2002), whilst correlations between the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
1983) and HADS-A were .64 -.81, between STAI and HADS-D they were .52 - .65 and 
between STAI and HADS-T they were from .68 - .71 (Bjelland et al., 2002).  
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Overall, Mykletun et al. (2001) asserts that the HADS has good psychometric properties in 
terms of factor structure, intercorrelation and internal consistency, across a range of samples. 
The HADS has been validated for use in a number of different languages and in non-clinical 
and clinical populations (Snaith, 2003). Within OCD research, the HADS has been used both 
in clinical populations (e.g. Jacobsen, Freeman, & Salkovskis, 2012) and non-clinical or 
analogue samples (e.g. Lappalainen, 2012; Ólafsson et al., 2013).  
2.3.4 Measure of guilt. Recent research has shown that guilt (Shapiro & Stewart, 
2011), or the fear or experiencing guilt (e.g., D’Olimpio et al., 2013) may play an important 
part in maintaining obsessions and compulsions. An appropriate measure of guilt (The Guilt 
Inventory; Jones, Schratter, & Kugler, 2000) was therefore selected for inclusion in the study 
(see Appendix F).  
A recent review of the literature on measuring guilt as a construct identified 29 different 
measures (Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, & Felton, 2010). Researchers in this field agree that 
‘guilt’ has been conceptualised in a number of different ways. Jones et al. (2000) assert that 
three approaches are most common in the literature: 1. Measuring guilt as an affective state, 
2. Measuring guilt as a trait or disposition, 3. Measuring guilt as a result of the strength of 
moral beliefs. The Guilt Inventory is a 45-item self-report questionnaire, consisting of three 
subscales which measure each of these domains: Trait Guilt, State Guilt and Moral Standards. 
Respondents are asked to answer using a five-point Likert scale, where (1) is strongly agree, 
(5) is strongly disagree and (3) is undecided. The items are coded so that a higher score 
means higher levels of trait and state guilt and more stringent moral standards.  
The Guilt Inventory was developed by Kugler and Jones (1992). They reported that 
Cronbach’s α = .81, .83 and .89 for the Moral Standards, State Guilt and Trait Guilt subscales 
respectively, indicating good levels of internal consistency. In a student sample, they also 
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found good test-retest reliability for the Moral Standards (r(134) = .84, p < .01)) and Trait 
Guilt subscales (r(134) = .72, p < .01). Test-retest reliability was lower on the State Guilt 
subscale (r(134) = .56, p < .01), however the authors argue that this would be expected, as 
‘State Guilt’ is by definition a transient construct.  
In the same sample, the researchers found that the Guilt Inventory demonstrated good 
concurrent validity, demonstrating strong correlations with a number of other scales, 
including the Mosher Guilt Inventory (Mosher, 1988) and Perceived Guilt Index – Trait and 
State subscales (Otterbacher & Munz, 1973).  
2.3.5 Moral dilemmas. An ever-increasing number of researchers have used moral 
dilemmas to study underlying psychological processes in decision making (e.g., Cushman et 
al., 2006; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Cushman and Greene (2012) 
propose that moral dilemmas should be conceptualised as experimental stimuli, which should 
be carefully designed to control for confounding variables.  These potential confounding 
variables include: the personal relevance of the dilemma, a participant’s linguistic ability, 
word-framing effects, and perspective (i.e., whether participants are asked to imagine 
themselves as an observer or put themselves in a given situation; Christensen & Gomila, 
2012). Christensen and Gomila (2012) also state that it is important to use vignettes that have 
been designed by ‘experts’ as they can then be assumed to be valid. 
Another factor to consider is the level of threat or conflict described in moral dilemmas. 
Moore, Stevens, and Conway (2011) argue that the use of vignettes describing extreme 
situations allows more reliable conclusions to be drawn about underlying moral intuitions as 
people’s responses are likely to be magnified. Cushman et al. (2006) investigated the 
intention bias previously using ‘high-conflict’ dilemmas and found a small effect size. This 
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suggests that it would be necessary to use ‘high-conflict’ dilemmas to replicate this small 
effect size.  
Taking into account the above considerations, the twelve vignettes previously used by 
Cushman et al. (2006) to investigate the intention bias were selected for use in the current 
study. The first author on the Cushman et al. (2006) paper was contacted by email and gave 
permission for the vignettes to be used in this study (F. Cushman, personal communication, 
March 14th, 2016).  
In the Cushman et al. (2006) study, six vignette pairs (twelve vignettes in total) were used to 
investigate the intention bias (see Appendix G). Six of these vignettes describe harm that 
occurs directly as a result of an action taken by a protagonist, six describe harm that occurs as 
a side-effect of an action taken by a protagonist. The vignettes are paired such that each 
describes a scenario which is identical, apart from the way that harm occurs.  
In addition to the six vignette pairs (Speedboat, burning, boxcar, switch, chemical, shark), 
two control vignettes were also included, as in Cushman et al. (2006). These control vignettes 
described a choice between lethal harm or a costless alternative. The rationale for including 
these control vignettes was to check whether participants were reading and understanding the 
scenarios they were presented with. If participants chose the lethal option, their responses 
were excluded from data analysis.  
2.3.6 Visual analogue scales. Following each vignette, participants were presented 
with four questions which required an answer on a visual analogue scale. These questions 
asked:  
1. How morally acceptable is this?  
2. How distressed would you feel?  
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3. How responsible would you feel?  
4. How guilty would you feel? 
Participants were asked to answer on an eight-point Likert scale, where 0 was anchored by 
‘not at all’ and 7 was anchored by ‘extremely’.  
To determine whether participants demonstrated an ‘intention bias’, their acceptability ratings 
were calculated and compared for the six vignettes detailing intentional harm and the six 
vignettes describing harm as a side-effect of an action.  
2.3.7 Measure of imagery. To examine whether use of imagery is related to OCD 
symptomatology, distress and guilt, a measure of imagery was included in the study.  
A number of self-report scales have been developed to measure use of imagery. The 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (Reisberg et al., 2003) is a twelve-item scale which asks 
participants to rate how often they engage in visual imagery in their everyday activities. More 
recently, the Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire was developed by Baugh et al. 
(2014). This is a 21-item questionnaire which asks participants to rate the vividness of 
imagery across different sensory modalities. Both of these scales show good internal 
reliability (α = .97 and .74 respectively). However, these scales rely on self-report and recall 
of the use of imagery. Researchers have therefore sought to operationalise the use of imagery 
and measure cognitive style in the moment, rather than relying on recall.  
Amit and Greene (2012) looked at moral judgments and whether the type of judgments 
people made were related to a visual or verbal cognitive style. They found that participants 
who preferred a visual processing style were more likely to make deontological judgments, 
and participants who preferred a verbal processing style were more likely to make utilitarian 
judgments. Amit and Greene (2012) used a computer-based working-memory task to classify 
participants as having either a visual or verbal cognitive style. It was not possible to use this 
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task in the current study as participants would be required to complete the task offline in 
addition to the online survey. The increased questionnaire/task burden would have had an 
adverse effect on the number of participants it was possible to recruit. For this reason, it was 
necessary to use a measure of imagery that could be completed as part of the online survey.  
Picture-Word task  
The Picture-Word task was originally devised by Holmes, Mathews, et al. (2008) to measure 
participants’ tendency to use imagery or a verbal cognitive strategy. Participants were 
presented with a picture and word simultaneously and asked to combine the stimuli by 
creating a verbal representation or mental image. The task consisted of 20 pictures, each of 
which was presented with a positive, or negative word, giving a total of 40 picture-word 
pairs. The stimuli were presented to participants in a paper booklet. After each picture-word 
combination was presented, participants were asked to answer four questions: 
1. How unpleasant/pleasant did you find the combination of this picture and word? 
2. When you combined this picture with its word, how much did you find yourself 
thinking in mental imagery (i.e. in mental pictures, sensory impressions)? 
3. When you combined this picture with its word, how much did you find yourself 
thinking in verbal thoughts? 
4. To what extent did your picture-word combination feel as if you were experiencing it? 
Each of these questions used 9-point Likert scales. For the first question, the numbers 1-9 
were anchored by 1 (not at all) and 9 (extremely). For the second and third questions relating 
to style of thinking, the numbers 1-9 were anchored 1 (not at all) and 9 (all of the time) and 
for the final question, the numbers 1-9 were anchored by 1 (not at all) and 9 (a great deal).  
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Recently, the Picture-Word task has been adapted so that the length of time the stimuli are 
displayed for is held constant (Ji, personal communication, May 2015). To achieve this the 
task was set up in MATLAB; participants view a fixation cross for 1500ms, before the 
picture-word combination which is displayed for 3000ms.  
In the current study, the Picture-Word task was adapted for use on the Qualtrics platform. 
The size of each picture was set to 600 x 500 pixels and a Javascript function was used to 
code the length of time the fixation cross and picture-word pair are displayed for.  
Task outline 
Consistent with previous use of the task (Ji, personal communication, May 5th, 2017) 
participants were initially presented with instructions for the task (see Appendix H), and an 
example of a picture-word pair and Likert-scale response questions. Following this example, 
participants were shown a practice trial which demonstrated the length of time the stimuli 
would be presented for.  
After completing the practice trial, participants viewed 40 picture-word pairs in total (20 
positive combinations and 20 negative combinations which were presented in a random 
order). There were 20 pictures in total, each of which was combined once with a negative 
word and once with a positive word such that each picture was viewed twice (see Appendix 
M for an example). Each picture-word combination was followed by four 9-point Likert-scale 
response questions (range 1-9; see Figure 2.2 below).  
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Figure 2.2.  PWT Likert-scale response subscales.  
Participants’ answers to the second question (use of mental imagery) were summed to 
generate a score for participants’ propensity to use imagery (range 20 – 180). For the 
purposes of exploratory analysis (see section 3.5.1), participants’ answers for each of the four 
subscales (‘pleasantness’, ‘imagery’, ‘verbal’ and ‘experiencing’) were separated into 
positive or negative stimulus valence then summed. 
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Pilot. The study was tested by a small sample of individuals from a non-
clinical and student population (N = 4). They completed an initial draft of the survey and 
provided feedback as follows: 
-  One participant commented that the instructions for the Picture-Word task were not clear. 
In response to this, the instructions were amended and an additional example was provided 
before the task commenced.  
- Another commented that the survey takes a considerable amount of time to complete. The 
survey was configured in Qualtrics so that it could be completed in sections. To maintain 
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particpants’ interest, measures were split up where possible and consideration was given to 
the order that measures were presented in. 
2.4.2 Survey design. The survey was created on the Qualtrics platform 
(www.qualtrics.com) due to the functionality and security features available. See Table 2.1 
below for an overview. 
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Table 2.1. Survey flow 
Block Title Description 
Introduction/consent Participants were presented with an introductory page, the information sheet (see Appendix I), consent form 
(see Appendix J), details about incentives and the ability to pause the survey in order to return to it at a later 
date.  
Demographic information A series of multiple choice or open-response questions, described previously in the measures section.  
OCI-R and HADS Participants were presented with the OCI-R and HADS on separate pages in table format.  
Moral dilemma instructions Participants viewed the following instructions: 
“Please read the following passages carefully, then answer the questions below. Imagine you are the person 
described in each of the stories.  You will see seven passages in total, each followed by four questions. The 
passages are separated by a horizontal line.  Make sure you scroll down to the bottom of the page to 
complete this section.” 
Vignettes (first section) Seven vignettes presented in a random order. One of these was a control vignette (option not to cause harm), 
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 three detailed intentional harm and three described harm as a side-effect of an action.  
Practice picture-word task Instructions for the task, an example and practice (timed) picture-word pair, followed by practice questions.  
Picture-word task (first section) Twenty picture-word stimuli (ten negative valence, ten positive) presented in a random order each followed 
by Likert-scale questions. 
Guilt Inventory Participants were presented with the Guilt Inventory in table format.  
Vignettes (second section) Seven vignettes presented in a random order. One of these was a control vignette (option not to cause harm), 
three detailed intentional harm and three described harm as a side-effect of an action. 
Picture-word task (second 
section) 
Twenty picture-word stimuli (ten negative valence, ten positive) presented in a random order each followed 
by Likert-scale questions. 
Debrief Participants presented with a ‘thank-you’ page, informing them they had finished the study, along with 
further information and the option to opt-in to a prize-draw.  
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2.4.3 Debrief. Following the final questionnaire, participants were presented with a 
page thanking them for their time and input, followed by an explanation of the purpose of the 
study (see Appendix L). Participants were given an option to provide their email address to 
opt into a prize draw and to obtain a copy of the results. They were provided with the contact 
details for the research team and given the option to download these, should they wish to 
contact the research team at a later date. Finally, participants were shown a page with details 
of agencies who would be able to provide support, if completing the questionnaires had 
raised any concerns. 
2.5 Ethics 
As this study recruited from mental health charities, students and the general population, 
ethical approval was applied for and granted through the Royal Holloway, University of 
London Ethics Committee (see Appendix K). Piloting and recruitment commenced after 
ethical approval had been granted.  
In considering the ethical issues raised by this study a number of guidelines were referred to, 
including the British Psychological Society Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2014), e-
Professionalism guidance on the use of social media (BPS, 2012), and Ethics guidelines for 
internet-mediated research (BPS, 2013).  
As this study was conducted online, it was important to consider the ethical issues raised by 
this. The BPS (2013) state that it is crucial to consider how to obtain valid consent online. 
Any consent procedures should be simple, sufficient clear information should be provided 
and it should be made clear that participants are able to withdraw their data. The present 
study provided a clear and succinct information sheet, followed by a consent page (as 
described above, see Appendix J). Participants were asked to select ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to provide 
consent, or close the browser window should they not wish to continue. If they did not select 
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a response, Qualtrics was set to prompt participants to answer so they did not skip past the 
consent page. Participants were provided with the contact details for the research team at the 
beginning and end of the survey and given the opportunity to download and keep these. 
The study asks participants to respond to questions about mood and moral dilemmas. These 
questions had the potential to cause distress. Participants were informed that they were free to 
discontinue the survey at any point and provided with the contact details for agencies who 
could provide support (GP, NHS direct, Samaritans, Royal Holloway student counselling 
service, MIND, Emergency services). They were also encouraged to contact the research 
team should they have any questions or concerns.  
To maintain anonymity, Qualtrics was set up to assign each participant a unique identification 
code. Any data downloaded from Qualtrics was stored in a password-protected file on an 
encrypted memory stick and accessed only by the research team. As participants were asked 
to provide their email address, which could potentially identify individuals, this information 
was stored separately from responses.  
2.6 Analysis 
At the end of recruitment, the data from the online survey were transferred directly from 
Qualtrics to SPSS (Version 21 for Windows), using the ‘export’ function. Statistical analyses 
are described in detail in the Results section which follows this chapter. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter describes the data screening procedure and statistical analyses that were 
conducted to test the study hypotheses. All data were analysed using IBM Statistics 
Software Version 21.0 (IBM Corporation, 2012). Alpha levels were set at p < .05 and 
exact significance levels are reported to two decimal places, with the exception of 
values less than p = .01, which are reported to three decimal places as appropriate. All 
numerical values are reported to two decimal places with the exception of those 
reported in the multiple mediation analysis which are reported to three decimal places 
to provide meaningful information.  
3.2 Data screening 
The initial data screening process followed the steps described in Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001). Firstly, the data file was checked for accuracy using the SPSS 
‘Frequencies’ function. All variables were found to be within their expected range, 
with plausible values for means and standard deviations. Any missing data were 
coded as ‘999’ to assist with later analyses. Total scores were calculated for the OCI-
R, HADS (anxiety, depression and total scale), Guilt Inventory (GI: moral standards, 
trait and state guilt subscales), moral dilemma response scales and Picture-Word Task 
(PWT) subscales.  
Applying the exclusion criteria for the study, three participants’ data were removed 
from the analyses as they reported they were under the age of 18. Responses to the 
control moral dilemma vignettes were also checked: if participants gave a nonsensical 
or unethical response their data were removed from the analysis, consistent with the 
methodology in Cushman et al. (2006). One participant answered ‘unacceptable’ on 
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the first control dilemma, twelve participants answered ‘extremely acceptable’ on the 
second control dilemma; their data were excluded from analyses, as their responses 
implied they had not paid attention to the vignettes. The total sample size after these 
criteria were applied was 205.  
3.2.1 Missing data: continuous variables. Missing data can lead to a 
number of problems in analyses: a loss of statistical power, biased estimates and 
reduced generalisability (Kang, 2013). Missing data is particularly problematic when 
there is a non-random pattern of missing values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). To 
examine the amount and distribution of missing data in the current dataset, a ‘Missing 
Completely at Random’ test (MCAR; Little, 1988) was conducted for all continuous 
variables. Results for continuous variables with missing data are shown in Table 3.2 
below.  
There were no missing data on the GI: trait guilt and state guilt subscales and the 
moral dilemma response scales.  
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Table 3.1 
Little’s MCAR test for continuous variables with missing data 
Variable Little’s MCAR test statistic 
HADS: Anxiety subscale (HADS-A) χ2(6) = 9.07, p = .17 
HADS: Depression subscale (HADS-D) χ2(12) = 9.94, p = .62 
HADS: Total scale χ2(39) = 46.18, p = .20 
OCI-R χ2(17) = 19.96, p = .28 
GI: Moral standards subscale χ2(14) = 10.35, p = .74 
PWT: Pleasantness subscale χ2(111) = 151.65, p = .006* 
PWT: Imagery subscale χ2(111) = 133.42, p = .07 
PWT: Verbal subscale χ2(111) = 146.51, p = .01* 
PWT: Experiencing subscale χ2(111) = 129.58, p = .11 
*Denotes significant result, indicating data not missing completely at random. 
As is clear from Table 3.1, all missing values were determined to be MCAR, with the 
exception of the missing values on the PWT ‘pleasantness’ and ‘verbal’ subscales. On 
further inspection of the dataset, three cases were identified with missing values on 
these subscales.  
According to Dong and Peng (2013), if data is not missing MCAR, the next step is to 
determine whether data are ‘missing at random’ (MAR). The recommended approach 
is to conduct a t-test to check whether ‘missingness’ is related to any other variables 
in the dataset (Dong & Peng, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). T-tests using a 
dummy variable to code cases with missing and non-missing values showed no 
significant differences on the OCI-R, GI, HADS, other PWT subscales or moral 
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dilemma responses. However, on inspection of the dataset, all missing values 
appeared during the second half of the survey, suggesting an attrition or boredom 
effect as participants became fatigued.  
Schafer and Graham (2002) state that while it can be difficult to entirely prove the 
assumption of MAR, an erroneous assumption of MAR may only have a minor 
impact on estimates and standard errors. For this reason, it was decided to proceed 
with caution with the assumption that the missing data in the sample were MAR.  
When data are assumed to be MAR, it is preferable wherever possible to use a method 
of dealing with missing data that preserves all cases for further analysis (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001). It was therefore decided to use an imputation method to create values 
for missing data on continuous variables. Expectation Maximisation (EM; Dempster, 
Laird, & Rubin, 1977) was selected as this procedure produces realistic estimates of 
variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and eliminates the need to delete cases or 
variables which would negatively impact statistical power. The EM algorithm was 
used on the HADS-A, HADS-D, OCI-R, GI: moral standards, and PWT (pleasant, 
imagery, verbal and experiencing subscales) variables to obtain a complete dataset for 
analysis.  
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3.2.2 Missing data: categorical variables. Two participants had missing 
data on the categorical variables within the dataset (one data point missing on 
‘ethnicity’ and one missing on ‘marital status’). It is not possible to use the EM 
algorithm with categorical variables, so these data points were left as missing. These 
missing data points were treated with pairwise deletion, which allows the maximum 
amount of data to be retained (Pigott, 2001) as cases are only excluded from analyses 
requiring that specific variable (Schlomer, Bauman, & Card, 2010). There were no 
missing data points on ‘gender’, ‘age’, ‘religion’ or ‘first language’.  
3.2.3 Normality of data. In order to conduct parametric tests, it is an 
assumption that data are normally distributed. To understand the shape of a 
distribution, the skewness (symmetry) and kurtosis (shape of the distribution’s peak) 
should be inspected (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
Whole sample 
In a large sample (N > 200), it is not necessary to calculate numerical values for 
skewness and kurtosis due to the small standard errors in a sample of this size (Field, 
2009). Histograms with a normal curve were generated and inspected for each 
continuous variable, the conclusions from these are shown in Table 3.2 below.  
With the exception of the HADS-A, GI subscales, PWT (imagery, verbal and 
experiencing subscales) and acceptability ratings for the vignettes, all distributions 
appeared to deviate from normal in the sample as a whole. Due to the large sample 
size, the potential impact of this deviation from normal is small (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001). 
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Table 3.2 
Skewness and kurtosis for continuous variables (N = 205) 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
Age Positive Normal 
OCI-R Positive Normal 
HADS-A Normal Normal 
HADS-D Positive Normal 
HADS-total Positive Normal 
GI: State Guilt Normal Normal 
GI: Moral Standards Normal Normal 
GI: Trait Guilt Normal Normal 
Picture-Word Task: pleasantness Positive Positive 
Picture-Word Task: imagery Normal Normal 
Picture-Word Task: verbal Normal Normal 
Picture-Word Task: experiencing Normal Normal 
Moral dilemmas: acceptability (intentional harm) Normal Normal 
Moral dilemmas: acceptability (side-effect) Normal Normal 
Moral dilemmas: distress (intentional harm) Negative Positive 
Moral dilemmas: distress (side-effect) Negative Positive 
Moral dilemmas: responsibility (intentional harm) Negative Positive 
Moral dilemmas: responsibility (side-effect) Negative  Positive 
Moral dilemmas: guilt (intentional harm) Negative Positive 
Moral dilemmas: guilt (side-effect) Negative  Positive 
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Grouped data 
As analyses would also be conducted with grouped data (high-OC and low-OC as 
categorised by a cut-off of 21 on the OCI-R), the normality of the data was inspected 
within each of these sub-groups (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). As these groups were 
smaller (n = 72, n = 133) for high- and low-OC respectively, numerical values for 
skewness and kurtosis were calculated, along with z-scores (Field, 2009). These z-
scores are shown in Table 3.3 below. A cut-off value of 3.29 was used to define 
significant deviation from normality (Kim, 2013).
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Table 3.3 
Skewness and kurtosis values by group 
 High-OC (n = 72) Low-OC (n = 133) 
Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis 
Variable z-score z-score z-score z-score 
Age 7.28* 3.57* 8.61* 2.85 
OCI-R 2.59 -0.93 0.53 -1.46 
HADS Anxiety scale -0.62 -0.77 3.05 0.65 
HADS Depression scale 2.45 0.49 6.76* 2.19 
HADS total scale 0.97 -0.87 6.75* 1.41 
GI State Guilt  -0.07 -1.21 -1.71 0.79 
GI Moral Standards 0.15 0.54 2.22 1.11 
GI Trait Guilt 0.89 -1.04 -0.20 -0.88 
PWT pleasant 7.66* 3.23 -4.84* 3.43* 
PWT imagery -0.03 -0.80 -2.34 2.00 
PWT verbal -0.21 -0.95 0.53 0.71 
PWT experiencing -0.56 0.60 -0.64 0.78 
Acceptability: intentional harm -0.77 0.21 -0.17 -0.94 
Acceptability: side-effect harm -2.26 0.29 -1.24 0.11 
Distress: intentional harm -9.97* 4.40* -7.68* 2.18 
Distress: side-effect harm -10.29* 4.51* -6.26 1.36 
Responsibility: intentional harm -9.94* 4.48* -7.53* 2.23 
Responsibility: side-effect harm -10.43* 4.82* -7.21* 2.28 
Guilt: intentional harm -14.02* 6.22* -8.86* 2.72 
Guilt: side-effect harm -12.28* 5.55* -7.59* 2.19 
*p < .05, denotes significant deviation from normality. 
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3.2.4 Outliers. Consideration was also given to univariate outliers, defined 
as data points which are significantly different from the rest of the data (Field, 2009). 
Outliers should be screened for as they can bias the mean and standard deviation 
statistics. To do this, z-scores were calculated for each continuous variable. Minimum 
and maximum z-scores for each variable are shown in Table 3.4 below. 
As is clear from this table, outliers were identified both within the whole sample and 
the low- and high-OC groups on several variables. 
78 
 
Table 3.4 
Standardised z-scores to detect outliers 
 Low-OC (n = 133) High-OC (n = 72) Whole sample (N = 
205) 
Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
Variable z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score z-score 
Age -.86 4.95* -.90 3.90* -.84 4.54* 
OCI-R -1.20 2.50 -1.90 2.12 -1.25 3.15 
HADS-A -2.54 1.99 -1.94 2.85 -1.91 2.51 
HADS- D -1.42 2.88 -1.09 3.68* -1.23 3.35* 
HADS-total -1.98 2.64 -1.70 3.04 -1.78 3.08 
GI: State Guilt  -1.88 2.09 -2.81 2.46 -2.48 2.39 
GI: Moral Standards -2.25 3.11 -2.64 3.11 -2.69 3.29 
GI: Trait Guilt -1.65 2.45 -2.61 2.18 -2.23 2.18 
PWT: pleasant -4.93* 2.69 -1.74 3.98 -3.79* 5.45* 
PWT: imagery -2.92 2.39 -1.99 2.59 -3.22 2.41 
PWT: verbal -2.05 2.69 -1.99 2.22 -2.05 2.53 
PWT: experiencing -2.60 2.72 -3.01 1.96 -2.71 2.36 
Acceptability: 
intentional  
-2.44 2.14 -2.28 2.13 -2.39 2.14 
Acceptability: side-
effect  
-2.84 2.00 -2.51 1.93 -2.71 1.97 
Distress: intentional  -3.42* .70 -5.32* .58 -5.59* .65 
Distress: side-effect  -3.16 .77 -5.38* .56 -5.20* .69 
Responsibility: 
intentional  
-3.59* .77 .5.37* .62 -4.06* .71 
Responsibility: side-
effect  
-3.97 .82 -5.60* .62 -4.49* .74 
Guilt: intentional  -3.93 .71 -6.28* .54 -4.54* .64 
Guilt: side-effect  -3.61* .78 .5.96* .56 -4.40* .70 
*p < .05, denotes significant deviation from normality. 
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3.2.5 Dealing with assumption violations. As is clear from the data-
screening procedures described above, several variables were significantly different 
from normal and several outliers were identified. When data is significantly different 
from normal, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend transforming the data to deal 
with skewness, kurtosis and outliers unless there is a good reason not to do so.  
Field (2009) states that the same transformation should be applied to all variables 
within a dataset wherever possible, to ensure that the relationships between variables 
are preserved. Square root, logarithmic and reciprocal transformations were run to test 
the effect on the problematic variables within the dataset. These transformations did 
not successfully bring the data within expected ranges for skewness and kurtosis.  
As transforming the data was unsuccessful, the ‘bootstrap’ method was used as an 
alternative (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994). Bootstrapping works by taking repeated 
random samples from an existing dataset to create a number of ‘bootstrap’ samples 
which can then be used to approximate the sampling distribution of a statistic (Singh 
& Xie, 2008). The bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence interval (BCa) 
is proposed and recommended for general use, especially in cases in which the 
assumption of normality may be violated (Kelley, 2005). Efron (1984) recommends 
that the minimum number of bootstraps used in practice is 1000.  
Kelley (2005) also recommends the BCa bootstrap method in cases where the sample 
size across groups is not equal, as is the case in the current study. The only 
assumption of the BCa approach is that the data are a random and representative 
sample drawn from a larger population. As there was no reason to assume that the 
outliers in the current dataset are not representative of the population (they all fall 
within expected ranges for each variable), all outliers were left in the dataset so that 
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bootstrapping would result in a representative sample. All subsequent parametric 
analyses reported in this chapter use the BCa bootstrapping method with 1000 
bootstraps and confidence intervals set at 95%. When the range between the upper 
and lower level confidence intervals does not cross zero, statistical significance 
reaches the p < .05 level.  
3.3 Group differences 
To explore the data and check for confounding variables, any differences between the 
low- and high-OC groups were investigated. Sociodemographic variables included 
‘age’, ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘educational status’, ‘religion’, ‘marital status’, and ‘first 
language’. An independent t-test was conducted for ‘age’ as this is a continuous 
variable. As Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was significant (F = 11.15, p = 
.001), results of this test are reported with correction for unequal variances.  
For all other categorical variables, Chi-squared tests were used to check for group 
differences. Due to the small number of cases in some of the descriptive categories 
(e.g., ‘Other Asian’), categories have been grouped together to allow for meaningful 
interpretation of the results and to increase statistical power. Where the number of 
cases in a category was less than five, Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) is reported, as 
recommended by Field (2009). The results of these comparative tests are shown in 
Table 3.5. 
As is clear from Table 3.5, there were no significant differences between the groups 
on ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘religion’, ‘marital status’ and ‘first language’. However, 
there were significant differences between the high- and low-OC groups on ‘age’ and 
‘education’. Previous research has shown that level of education does not affect 
people’s responses to moral dilemmas (Hauser et al., 2007), however age does affect 
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moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969) so ‘age’ was controlled for 
wherever possible in further analyses. 
Independent t-tests comparing the low- and high-OC groups were also conducted for 
all other variables of interest in the dataset. The results of these are reported in Table 
3.6 below. Where Levene’s test showed that there were unequal variances, the 
appropriate corrected t-statistic is reported. 
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Table 3.5 
Group comparisons for sociodemographic variables 
 Group   
Variable Low-OC High-OC Total sample Test statistic 
Age, M [SD] 27.19 
[10.23] 
22.72 [5.50] 25.62 [9.11] t(203) = 4.06, p < .001*, 
BCa CI: 2.30, 6.63 
Gender, n (%) 
Male 
Female 
Other/prefer not to say 
 
23 (17.29) 
107 (80.45) 
3 (2.26) 
 
16 (22.22) 
52 (72.22) 
4 (5.56) 
 
39 (19.02) 
159 (77.56) 
7 (3.41) 
 
χ2  (2) = 2.49, p = .29, 
FET = 2.59, p = .26 
Ethnicity, n (%) 
White British 
Not White British 
Prefer not to say/missing 
 
98 (73.68) 
31 (23.30) 
4 (3.01) 
 
54 (75.00) 
18 (25.00) 
0 (0.00) 
 
152 (74.15) 
49 (23.90) 
4 (1.95) 
 
χ2 (2) = 1.68, p = .53, 
FET = 1.23, p = .65 
Education, n (%) 
No formal qualifications 
GCSE/BTEC 
A levels or equivalent 
Further education 
Prefer not to say/unsure 
 
0 (0.00) 
2 (1.51) 
45 (33.83) 
79 (59.40) 
7 (5.26) 
 
3 (4.17) 
7 (9.72) 
34 (47.22) 
27 (37.50) 
1 (1.39) 
 
3 (1.46) 
9 (4.39) 
79 (38.54) 
106 (51.71) 
8 (3.90) 
 
χ2 (4) = 21.03, p <.001*, 
FET = 19.60, p < .001* 
Religion, n (%) 
No religion 
Religious 
Prefer not to say/unsure 
 
83 (62.41) 
45 (33.83) 
5 (3.76) 
 
37 (51.39) 
27 (37.50) 
8 (11.11) 
 
120 (58.54) 
72 (35.12) 
13 (6.34) 
χ2 (2) = 5.13, p = .08, 
FET = 4.96, p = .08 
Marital status, n (%) 
Not with partner 
With partner 
Prefer not to say/missing 
 
81 (60.90) 
49 (36.84) 
3 (2.26) 
 
51 (70.83) 
18 (25.00) 
3 (4.17) 
 
132 (64.39) 
67 (32.68) 
6 (2.93) 
χ2 (2) = 2.78, p = .28, 
FET = 2.91, p = .23 
First language 
English 
Other 
 
119 (89.47) 
14 (10.53) 
 
59 (81.94) 
13 (18.06) 
 
178 (86.83) 
27 (13.17) 
χ2 (1) = 2.32, p = .13 
* Denotes significant result; BCa CI = bootstrapped confidence interval, FET = Fisher’s exact test 
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Table 3.6 
Group comparisons for clinical variables 
                            Group   
Variable  Low-OC High-OC Whole sample Test statistic 
 
OCI, M [SD]+ 
 
9.96 [4.73] 
 
34.60 [11.36] 
 
18.62 [14.08] 
 
t(85) = 21.79, p = .001*, Bca CI: -27.30, -22.02 
HADS-A 6.89 [3.55] 13.11 [3.98] 9.07 [4.75] t(203) = 11.47, p = .001*, Bca CI: -7.30, -5.16 
HADS-D 3.88 [3.57] 6.60 [3.95] 4.84 [3.92] t(203) = -5.01 , p = .001*, Bca CI: -3.74, -1.68 
HADS-total 10.77 [6.32] 19.70 [6.93] 13.91 [7.80] t(203) = -9.33, p = .001*, Bca CI: -10.82, -7.07 
GI: State guilt+ 28.69 [5.51] 31.90 [3.37] 30.78 [4.51] t(126) = 7.17, p = 001*, Bca CI: 5.89, 10.44 
GI: Moral standards 40.66 [7.83] 39.50 [6.91] 40.40 [5.32] t(203) = 1.06, p =.26, Bca CI: -.97, 3.31 
GI: Trait guilt 55.17 [9.43] 65.94 [7.42] 62.16 [9.65] t(203) = 7.58, p = .001*, Bca CI: 11.55, 19.90 
PWT: pleasant+ 190.97 [20.46] 196.43 [36.37] 192.88 [27.17] t(96) = -1.38, p = .25, Bca CI: -14.65, 3.31 
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                   Group    
Variable  Low-OC High-OC Whole sample Test statistic 
PWT: imagery 
PWT: verbal 
215.92 [60.18] 
179.57 [67.15] 
236.17 [47.88] 
193.86 [72.89] 
223.03 [56.88] 
184.59 [69.38] 
t(203) = -2.46, p = .01*, Bca CI: 35.57, -4.24 
t(203) = -1.41, p = .20, Bca CI: -36.08, 7.44 
PWT: experiencing 180.68 [54.18] 218.37 [53.94] 193.92 [56.89] t(203) = -4.76, p = .001*, Bca CI: -52.94, -22.28 
Acceptability: intentional harm 22.36 [9.18] 21.69 [9.53] 22.13 [9.28] t(203) = .49, p = .62, Bca CI: -2.01, 3.35 
Acceptability: side-effect harm 24.65 [8.70] 23.71 [9.46] 24.32 [8.96] t(203) = .72, p = .48, Bca CI: -1.67, 3.61 
Distress: intentional harm 38.08 [5.58] 38.47 [6.11] 38.22 [5.76] t(203) = -.46, p = .67, Bca CI: -2.11, 1.45 
Distress: side-effect harm 37.32 [6.10] 38.60 [6.07] 37.78 [6.11] t((203) = -1.44, p = .15, Bca CI: -3.15, .50 
Responsibility: intentional harm+ 35.09 [8.95] 38.29 [6.01] 36.21 [8.17] t(194) = -30.05, p = .006*, Bca CI: -5.24, -1.06 
Responsibility: side-effect harm+ 34.78 [8.77] 38.39 [5.78] 36.05 [8.02] t(195) = -3.54 , p = .002*, Bca CI: -5.65, -1.60 
Guilt: intentional harm+ 35.76 [8.84] 38.69 [6.16] 36.79 [8.11] t(190) = -2.78, p = .01*, Bca CI: -4.99, -.74 
Guilt: side-effect harm+ 35.09 [8.88] 38.38 [6.44] 36.24 [8.24] t(186) = -3.04, p = .005*, BCa CI: -5.47, -1.22 
*Denotes significant result  
+T-statistic corrected for unequal variances.  
Bootstrapped confidence intervals are provided. 
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As is clear from Table 3.6, significant differences were found between groups on the 
OCI-R, HADS-A, HADS-D, HADS-total, GI: state guilt, GI: trait guilt, PWT: 
imagery, PWT: experiencing, Responsibility: intentional harm, Responsibility: side-
effect harm, Guilt: intentional harm, and Guilt: side-effect harm variables. The result 
on the OCI-R demonstrates the expected difference between the low- and high-OC 
groups. 
3.4 Hypothesis 1 
‘People in the low-OC group will demonstrate an intention bias, people in the high-
OC group will not do so.’ 
To test this hypothesis, analyses were conducted to replicate the methodology used in 
Cushman et al. (2006). It should be noted that it was not possible to consider age as a 
covariate in these analyses.  
3.4.1 Paired sample t-tests. Analyses were conducted to examine the 
presence of an intention bias in the low- and high-OC groups. The ‘moral 
acceptability’ ratings for vignettes describing intentional harm and harm as a side-
effect were compared, as in Cushman et al. (2006). The independent variable entered 
in this analysis was ‘OCD-group’ and the dependent variable ‘acceptability’ rating.  
In the low-OC group, a paired samples t-test showed that participants judged harm as 
a side-effect (M = 24.65, SD = 8.70, BCa CI: 23.08, 26.15) to be significantly more 
acceptable than intentional harm (M = 22.36, SD = 9.18, BCa CI: 20.70, 23.98; t(132) 
= -7.50, p < .001). This result demonstrates the presence of an intention bias in the 
low-OC group.  
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In the high-OC group, a paired samples t-test showed that participants judged harm as 
a side-effect (M = 23.71, SD = 9.46, BCa CI: 21.53, 25.75) to be significantly more 
acceptable than intentional harm (M = 21.69, SD = 9.53, BCa CI: 19.63, 23.78; t(71) 
= -4.81, p < .001). This result demonstrates the presence of an intention bias in the 
high-OC group.  
3.4.2 Summary. The presence of the intention bias was demonstrated in 
both the low- and high-OC groups, indicating that Hypothesis 1 was not supported. 
The implications of this will be discussed in more detail in the Discussion chapter.  
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3.5 Hypothesis 2 
‘More frequent use of imagery will be associated with higher levels of OCD 
symptomatology, distress and guilt.’ 
To test this hypothesis, Pearson correlations were conducted to explore the 
relationship between participants’ total score on the OCI-R (OCI total), GI: state guilt, 
GI: trait guilt, PWT: imagery, vignettes: distress, and vignettes: guilt. As three 
measures of guilt were included, Bonferroni correction was applied to reduce the 
chance of a Type I error (Field, 2009) such that the corrected confidence level for 
measures of guilt was p = .02. Results are shown in Table 3.7 below. Bootstrapped 
confidence intervals confirmed the findings reported in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7 
Correlation matrix showing Pearson’s r for OCI-R, PWT, GI and vignette responses 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. OCI total —     
2. PWT: imagery .19** —    
3. GI: state guilt .50** .17* —   
4. GI: trait guilt .51** .17* .79** —  
5. Vignettes: distress .02 .15* .04 .13 — 
6. Vignettes: guilt .14 .14 .08 .15* .80** 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 3.7 shows that there was a significant positive correlation between OCD 
symptomatology (as measured on the OCI-R), state and trait guilt (measured on the 
GI) as expected. There was also a significant positive correlation between OCD 
symptomatology and use of imagery (measured on the PWT), indicating that more 
frequent use of imagery was associated with a higher level of OCD symptomatology, 
however it should be noted that this correlation was smaller in size. There were no 
significant associations between OCD symptomatology and reported levels of distress 
and guilt in response to the vignettes. These results partially support Hypothesis 2 as 
OCD symptomatology was associated with state guilt, trait guilt and use of imagery. 
These findings will be discussed further in the following chapter.  
It is also evident from Table 3.7 that there were significant positive correlations 
between use of imagery, state guilt, trait guilt and distress in response to the vignettes. 
State and trait guilt were significantly positively correlated with each other and higher 
levels of trait guilt were associated with a higher level of guilt in response to the 
vignettes. Finally, distress in response to the vignettes showed a significant positive 
correlation with guilt in response to the vignettes.  
3.5.1 PWT: exploratory analyses.  In addition to measuring imagery, the 
PWT also measures propensity to think verbally, the extent to which the image or 
sentence produced was ‘pleasant’ and the extent to which the image or sentence was 
‘experienced’ (see Section 2.3.7). Descriptive data for each of the PWT subscales are 
presented in Table 3.8 below. For comparison purposes, the data for each subscale are 
provided by stimulus valence (positive or negative).  
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Table 3.8 
Descriptive statistics for PWT 
Variable Minimum Maximum M [SD] 
PWT: Imagery (positive) 20 180 111.88 [28.25] 
PWT: Imagery (negative) 20 180 111.16 [29.56] 
PWT: Verbal (positive) 20 180 92.19 [34.86] 
PWT: Verbal (negative) 20 180 92.40 [35.20] 
PWT: Pleasantness 
(positive) 
55 169 97.12 [14.44] 
PWT: Pleasantness 
(negative) 
34 172 95.77 [14.10] 
PWT: Experiencing 
(positive) 
20 180 97.79 [28.83] 
PWT: Experiencing 
(negative) 
20 164 96.12 [28.96] 
 
To check whether PWT stimulus valence (positive or negative) was related to level of 
OCD symptomatology and guilt, Pearson correlations were conducted between each 
of the PWT subscales, OCI-R total scores, GI: state and trait guilt, and vignettes: 
guilt. As previously, Bonferroni correction was applied to reduce the chance of a 
Type I error (Field, 2009) such that the corrected confidence level for measures of
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guilt was p = .02. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 3.9 below. 
Bootstrapped confidence intervals confirmed the findings reported in Table 3.9. 
Of note, Table 3.9 (below) shows that: 
(1) There were large significant positive correlations  (> .6; Cohen, 1992a) between 
participants’ responses to positive and negative picture-word pairs. This was the case 
for each of the PWT subscales (Imagery, Verbal, Pleasantness and Experiencing).  
(2) There was a significant positive correlation between participants’ propensity to 
use imagery in response to positive picture-word pairs, and their scores on the OCI-R 
(p = .01), however it should be noted that these correlations were small.  
(3) There were significant positive correlations between participants’ propensity to 
use imagery in response to negative picture-word pairs and their scores on the OCI-R, 
GI: state guilt and GI: trait guilt (p < .01 for each construct). As previously, it should 
be noted that these correlations were small.  
(4) Participants’ propensity to use a verbal strategy in response to both positive and 
negative picture-word pairs, was significantly positively associated with scores on the 
OCI-R (p < .05) but not with GI: state or trait guilt.  
(5) Participants’ ‘pleasantness’ and ‘experiencing’ ratings showed a significant 
positive correlation with their scores on the OCI-R for both positive and negative 
picture-word pairs. In the case of the ‘experiencing’ subscale, these correlations were 
moderate (.33 and .35 respectively), whilst they were small (< .2) in the case of the 
‘pleasantness’ subscale.  Participants’ ‘experiencing’ ratings also showed a significant 
positive correlation (p < .001) with their scores on the GI: state guilt and trait guilt 
subscales, for both positive and negative picture-word pairs. 
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Table 3.9 
Correlation matrix showing Pearson’s r for PWT (positive and negative valence), OCI-R, GI and vignette responses: guilt 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. PWT: Imagery (positive) —           
2. PWT: Imagery (negative) .94** —          
3. PWT: Verbal (positive) -.03 -.03 —         
4. PWT: Verbal (negative) -.01 -.04 .96** —        
5. PWT: Pleasantness (positive) .31** .29** .19** .19** —       
6. PWT: Pleasantness (negative) .31** .31** .18* .20** .81** —      
7. PWT: Experiencing (positive) .66** .60** .22** .22** .34** .35** —     
8. PWT: Experiencing (negative) .64** .64** .22** .23** .33** .38** .94** —    
9. OCI-R (total) .18* .20** .14* .14* .16* .18* .33** .35** —   
10. GI: state guilt .13 .19** -.02 -.03 .03 .05 .23** .25** .50** —  
11. GI: trait guilt .15* .19** .01 .01 .00 .03 .26** .29** .51** .79** — 
12. Vignettes: guilt .15 .12 -.02 -.02 .04 .06 .16 .14 .14 .08 .15 
 *p  < .05, **p < .01
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3.6 Hypothesis 3 
‘State and trait guilt will mediate the relationship between imagery and OCD 
symptomatology’.  
A multiple mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) was conducted to explore whether the 
relationship between imagery and OCD symptomatology was mediated by different 
types of guilt, as measured by scores on the GI: trait and state guilt subscales.  
3.6.1 Data screening. In addition to the data screening procedures described 
earlier in this chapter, Hayes (2013) recommends checking that constructs entered 
into the model are not highly correlated with each other (multicollinearity). If this is 
the case, it becomes difficult to tell which potential mediator variables are important. 
For this reason, variables were screened for multicollinearity in the planned multiple 
mediation analysis.  
Field (2009) advocates a thorough approach to checking for multicollinearity, 
examining the variance inflation factor (VIF), which indicates whether variables have 
a strong linear relationship. According to Myers (1990, as cited in Field, 2009) a VIF 
greater than 10 indicates potential problems with multicollinearity. Menard  (1995) 
also recommends examining the tolerance statistic (1/VIF) and suggests that any 
value less than .2 could indicate concern; however, Field (2009) advocates using a 
stricter tolerance statistic of .1. If the average VIF value is substantially greater than 1, 
this could also indicate potential bias in a regression model as a result of 
multicollinearity (Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990).  
Using these recommendations: VIF values for potential mediator variables (trait and 
state guilt) and the independent variable (use of imagery) were all less than 3, 
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tolerance statistics were all greater than .1 and the average VIF value was 2.14. These 
results all indicate no serious problems with multicollinearity.  
3.6.2 Multiple mediation analysis. A multiple mediation approach was 
adopted as suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008), who view using a single multiple 
mediation model as preferable to several simple models. When several simple 
mediation models are conducted simultaneously, these models may suffer from the 
‘omitted variable problem’ which can lead to biased parameter estimates (Judd & 
Kenny, 1981). Additionally, including all potential mediators in the model allows 
competing theories to be “pitted against each other” (Hayes, 2009, p. 415). It is then 
possible to draw conclusions about the extent to which the set of mediators have an 
effect, when the influence of other mediators is taken into account.  
Several methods have been proposed for testing hypotheses about mediation, however 
it has recently been suggested that the bootstrap method is preferred over the more 
traditional causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986, as cited in MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). This approach does not require the 
assumption of normality to be satisfied and has greater statistical power (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). Preacher and Hayes (2008) advise using 5000 bootstrap samples 
wherever possible, and this approach was adopted in the current study.  
According to Preacher and Hayes (2008), mediation occurs when it can be shown that 
a predictor variable (X) affects an outcome variable (Y) indirectly through one or 
more mediator variables (M). Complete mediation occurs when variable X no longer 
affects Y after the effect of M has been taken into account. A partial mediation 
relationship exists when the indirect effect of X through M on Y reduces the size of 
the direct relationship between X and Y. In other words, mediation occurs when the 
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direct relationship between X and Y (path c’) is either partially or totally accounted 
for by the indirect relationship between X and Y through M (paths a and b; see Figure 
3.2).  
95 
 
  
Figure 3.1. Simple mediation diagram 
A multiple mediation analysis was conducted using the PROCESS macro V2.16 
(Model 4) for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). State and trait guilt (measured on the GI) were 
entered simultaneously into the model as potential mediators between imagery 
(measured on the PWT) and OCD symptomatology (measured on the OCI-R), whilst 
controlling for age as in previous analyses.  
A visual representation of the multiple mediation model is shown in Figure 3.3 below, 
along with the regression coefficients and corresponding significance values for each 
path. 
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Figure 3.2. Multiple mediation analysis of the effect of imagery on OCD symptoms, 
mediated by guilt (significant regression coefficients: *p < .05, **p < .01). 
3.6.3 Direct effects. Table 3.10 shows the results for regression coefficients, 
standard errors and significance values, for the relationship between imagery (X) and 
mediators (M1 and M2), the relationship between mediators (M1 and M2) and OCD 
symptomatology (Y) and the direct effect between imagery (X) and OCD 
symptomatology (Y). As is clear from the table, the paths between imagery and 
state/trait guilt (paths a1 and a2 on Figure 3.2) are significant. The paths between 
state/trait guilt and OCD symptomatology are significant (paths b1 and b2 on Figure 
3.3). Finally, the direct effect of imagery on OCD symptomatology is also significant 
(path c on Figure 3.3). Bootstrapped confidence intervals also confirmed that all paths 
were significant.
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Table 3.10 
Results of multiple mediation analysis (direct effects) 
 Consequent 
 OCI-R: OCD symptomatology (Y) GI: state guilt (M1) GI: trait guilt (M2) 
Antecedent b SE p b SE p b SE p 
Age -.25 .09 .007** .05 .06 .42 .17 .12 .15 
PWT: imagery (X) .04 .02 .01* .02 .01 .02* .05 .02 .02* 
GI: state guilt (M1) .43 .16 .009** - - - - - - 
GI: trait guilt (M2) .25 .09 .004** - - - - - - 
Regression model R2 = .03 
F(2,202) = 3.20, p = .04* 
R2 = .04 
F (2, 202) = 4.20, p = .02* 
R2 = .08 
F(2, 202) = 8.31, p < .001*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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The regression coefficients detailed in Table 3.10 (above) indicate that:  
(1) More frequent use of imagery was associated with higher scores on the trait 
and state guilt subscales. 
(2) Higher scores on the trait and state guilt subscales were associated with higher 
levels of OCD symptomatology.  
(3) More frequent use of imagery predicted higher levels of OCD 
symptomatology.  
3.6.4 Indirect effects. To test the mediation hypothesis, the indirect effect of 
imagery (X) on OCD symptomatology (Y) through trait and state guilt (M1 and M2) 
was explored. Confirming the mediation hypothesis, the path between imagery and 
OCD symptomatology was no longer significant when the effects of trait and state 
guilt were taken into account (path c’ on Figure 3.2, b = .02, SE = .01, p = .14). This 
indicates partial mediation, as the direct relationship between imagery and OCD 
symptomatology reduced in size when state and trait guilt were entered into the model 
as mediator variables. Taken together, state and trait guilt were significant mediators 
of the relationship between imagery and OCD symptomatology, as shown by 
bootstrapped confidence intervals which do not cross zero (see Table 3.11). Trait and 
state guilt together accounted for approximately 22% of the total effect. When 
considered separately, state and trait guilt accounted for 10 and 12% of the total 
effect, respectively.  
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Table 3.11 
Indirect effects of mediators 
 Effect SE BCa CI 
[LCI, UCI] 
Total .022 .008 .007, .039 
Mediator    
State guilt .010 .005 .003, .023 
Trait guilt .012 .006 .003, .026 
 
These findings suggest that Hypothesis 3 was supported, as state and trait guilt 
partially mediated the relationship between use of imagery and OCD 
symptomatology. The implications of this will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
In this final chapter, the aims and findings of the study are summarised then discussed 
in the context of the existing literature. The theoretical implications of the main 
findings are considered, followed by an outline of the strengths and limitations of the 
research. Finally, potential avenues for future research and the clinical implications of 
the study are explored, before the chapter closes with concluding remarks.  
4.2 Aims 
This study aimed to investigate moral reasoning (the intention bias), guilt and imagery 
in people with OCD. The main hypotheses were as follows: 
(1) Firstly, the study investigated the ‘intention bias’, as described in Cushman, 
Young, and Hauser (2006). The moral principle that intentional harm is less 
acceptable than harm which is a side-effect of an action has been widely 
documented in the general population (e.g., Cushman, 2015), however this 
principle has not previously been investigated in people with OCD. Based on 
findings relating to a similar moral principle (the omission bias; Franklin et al., 
2009; Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000), this study proposed that people in the high-
OC group (according to a clinical cut-off of >21 on the OCI-R; Foa et al., 
2002) would have higher moral standards than people in the low-OC group 
(<21 on the OCI-R).  
It was expected that the inflated sense of responsibility, ‘thought-action 
fusion’ and fear of guilt found in people with OCD would affect the moral 
decisions that they make, meaning they would be less likely to view harm as 
acceptable, whether this harm was intentional or not. It was therefore proposed 
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that people in the high-OC group would be less likely to demonstrate an 
intention bias, as they would universally view any type of harm as 
unacceptable.  
(2) Secondly, the study aimed to explore moral emotion in OCD: whether high 
levels of distress and guilt are associated with a high level of OCD 
symptomatology and more frequent use of imagery. It is well known that 
people with OCD experience intrusive imagery and that imagery is associated 
with high levels of emotional arousal (Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Holmes, 
Mathews, et al., 2008). For this reason, it was proposed that frequent use of 
imagery (measured on the PWT) would be positively correlated with levels of 
guilt (state and trait), distress and OCD symptomatology.  
(3) Finally, the association between imagery and OCD was explored. As 
previously mentioned, the experience of imagery is linked with high levels of 
emotional arousal. The intrusive images experienced in OCD lead to strong 
negative emotions such as distress, anxiety and guilt which can lead to 
compensatory behaviour. However, whilst guilt has been suggested to be a key 
maintaining factor in OCD, it remains unclear exactly how guilt is implicated. 
A recent meta-analysis suggested that state and trait guilt may be important 
constructs which are linked with a poorer treatment outcome, although the 
evidence remains equivocal (Shapiro & Stewart, 2011). There is clear 
evidence however, that an increase in guilty feelings leads to an increase in 
OCD-like behaviour (D’Olimpio et al., 2013). 
In summary, the experience of intrusive imagery and the resulting emotional 
response (guilt) could contribute to the development and maintenance of OCD 
symptomatology. It was proposed that when intrusive images occur, guilt 
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(state and trait) would mediate the relationship between intrusive images and 
OCD symptomatology.  
To explore these hypotheses, participants in the study were asked to complete an 
online survey consisting of a battery of questionnaires, moral dilemmas and a 
visual/verbal task to classify their cognitive style.  
4.3 Hypothesis 1 – main findings and theoretical implications 
‘People in the low-OC group will demonstrate an intention bias, people in the high-
OC group will not do so.’ 
The results of the analyses did not support this hypothesis, as t-tests which replicated 
the methodology used in Cushman et al. (2006) showed the presence of the intention 
bias in both the low- and high-OC groups. Participants in both groups demonstrated 
an intention bias in the moral judgments they made, consistently indicating across 
vignettes that intentional harm was less morally acceptable than harm as a side-effect 
of an action. The results of these analyses will be explored in relation to the relevant 
moral philosophy and experimental psychology literature.  
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4.3.1 Universal moral grammar. The intention bias was found to exist in 
both the low- and high-OC groups, which is consistent with the assertion that the 
intention bias is “one of the oldest, best-documented and most reliable findings in the 
field of moral psychology” (Cushman, 2015, p. 97). Viewing intentional harm as 
morally worse than harm as the side effect of an action may be a universal intuitive 
principle (Mikhail, 2009). This would be consistent with the idea of a ‘universal 
moral grammar’, which suggests that individuals have unconscious knowledge of 
moral principles, consistent across culture, social class and time (e.g., Bartels, 
Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 2014). Although the content of moral beliefs 
varies, the concepts of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ seem to be a constant in most cultures. In 
this study, the notion of universal moral principles was supported by the finding that 
both the low- and high-OC groups rated intentional harm as worse than harm as the 
side-effect of an action. However, these findings were inconsistent with the expected 
findings set out in Hypothesis 1 and potential reasons for this will now be explored.  
In Cushman et al. (2006), the original study exploring three well-known moral 
principles, the researchers found that when participants were asked to justify the 
moral decisions they had made, they were able to explain their reasoning in the case 
of the ‘action principle’ but they could not do so in the case of the ‘contact’ or 
‘intention principle’. This implies that moral decisions which are consistent with the 
intention bias are made “without any conscious awareness of having gone through 
steps of searching, weighing, evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 1995, p. 
818). In a follow-up study on the intention bias, Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-
Xing Jin, and Mikhail (2007) found that moral judgments were unaffected by the level 
of participants’ education. This provides further evidence that the intention bias may 
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be a universal principle which is not affected by conscious reasoning. If judgments of 
intention are intuitive, they may be universal and unaffected by OCD 
symptomatology. 
4.3.2 Dual-process model of morality. It is well documented that people 
experience a strong negative emotional reaction when confronted with the possibility 
of causing harm to other people (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012). If this 
reaction is very powerful, or if people do not have the time (Suter & Hertwig, 2011), 
motivation or cognitive resources (Amit & Greene, 2012) to consider their decision, 
people are likely to make an automatic deontological decision that harm is 
unacceptable, regardless of how this harm occurs. However, if there are cognitive 
resources available, people are more likely to take their time and make a considered 
utilitarian decision which takes other factors into account. This is consistent with the 
dual-process model of morality which proposes that fast, automatic processing 
preferentially supports deontological judgments, whereas slower, cognitive processing 
preferentially supports utilitarian judgments (e.g., Greene et al., 2001).  
In the current study, people were given unlimited time to consider their responses to 
the moral dilemmas they were presented with. This could mean that participants in 
both the low- and high-OC groups made more utilitarian decisions as they had the 
cognitive resources available to do so. The intention bias is consistent with a 
utilitarian framework and this might explain why both groups made judgments in line 
with this principle. It would have been interesting to investigate whether, if a time 
limit had been imposed on participants, people with OCD responded with more 
deontological decisions due to potentially stronger emotional responses to harm. 
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Under time pressure, these strong emotional responses to harm would be difficult to 
override and the expected difference between groups could have emerged.  
Alternatively, Greene et al. (2001) found that when people considered impersonal 
moral dilemmas in which victims were ‘distant’, regions of the brain associated with 
cognitive reasoning were more active. If potential victims of harm are ‘distant’, then 
levels of emotional arousal are low and participants make more utilitarian choices 
(Carmona-Perera et al., 2013). The moral dilemmas given to participants in the 
current study described scenarios which participants were unlikely to come across in 
everyday life, meaning they may have had a minimal level of emotional response. If 
participants were able to psychologically distance themselves from the moral 
dilemmas which were presented, they would have been more able to engage in 
detailed cognitive processing (Trope & Liberman, 2010). As previously mentioned, 
this would mean that participants were more likely to make utilitarian decisions, 
consistent with the intention bias. This would be the case for the both the low- and 
high-OC groups, accounting for the lack of difference found between the groups.  
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4.3.3 Responsibility appraisals and guilt. If participants were able to 
psychologically distance themselves from the moral dilemmas they were given, this 
could also imply that they did not feel responsible for the harm which was described 
in the scenarios. Mancini and Gangemi (2011) found that people were less concerned 
about a potentially harmful event if they believed they were not responsible for a 
negative outcome. If they were not responsible for a negative outcome, then a fear of 
potential guilt was also reduced. Whilst people with OCD typically believe 
themselves to be more responsible for preventing harm than the general population 
(Arntz, Voncken, & Goosen, 2007), this may only be the case when a scenario is 
related to OCD-like concerns. In previous studies, researchers found that in the case 
of the omission bias, people with OCD made stricter moral decisions but only when 
presented with scenarios that were OCD-relevant (Siev et al., 2010; Wroe & 
Salkovskis, 2000). In the current study, the scenarios given were not relevant to 
typical OCD concerns, which could explain the lack of difference in the moral 
decisions made by the low- and high-OC groups.  
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4.3.4 Thought-action fusion, agency and intent. It has been proposed that 
people with OCD view intrusive thoughts about harm as the moral equivalent of harm 
which happens in reality (Salkovskis et al., 1995). The concept of ‘thought-action 
fusion’ means that for some people with OCD, thinking about harmful events 
increases the perceived likelihood that they will happen (Shafran, Thordarson, et al., 
1996). For this reason, it has been argued that people with OCD might feel less free or 
in control of their actions (Oren et al., 2016). If people with OCD believe that harm is 
their fault and inevitable, they might judge all harm as unacceptable. Just having a 
morally unacceptable thought could be sufficient for someone with OCD to think that 
a negative outcome is their fault, regardless of whether this outcome occurs as a direct 
result or as a side-effect of an action. People with OCD might have a different 
understanding of ‘intention’, meaning that they do not display the intention bias found 
in the general population.  
However, as previously mentioned, in the current study this was not the case; people 
in the low- and high-OC groups both evaluated intentional harm as morally worse 
than harm as the side-effect of an action. It may be that people with a high level of 
OCD symptoms (> 21 on OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) make judgments of intention which 
are similar to the judgments of intention found in the general population. Malle, 
Guglielmo, and Monroe (2014) proposed that when people make judgments of 
intention or blame, they ask whether people had the ‘capacity’ to prevent a bad 
outcome. In the case of this study, the options to prevent a bad outcome were clearly 
described and contrasted in each of the scenarios and it appears that people in the 
high-OC group were also able to appreciate this difference.  
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4.4 Hypothesis 2 – main findings and theoretical implications 
‘More frequent use of imagery will be associated with higher levels of OCD 
symptomatology, distress and guilt’.  
This hypothesis was partially supported by the results of the analyses as there were 
significant positive correlations between imagery, state guilt, trait guilt and OCD 
symptomatology. These correlations were small when imagery was associated with 
state and trait guilt (.17) and small when use of imagery was associated with OCD 
symptomatology (.19; Cohen, 1992). There was a large significant positive correlation 
between both state and trait guilt and OCD symptomatology (.50 and .51, 
respectively). However, imagery was not significantly associated with levels of 
distress or guilt in response to the vignettes. As previously, these findings will now be 
discussed in the context of the relevant literature (see sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2).  
Additional exploratory analyses for the PWT subscales indicated: 
(1) When the picture-word stimulus was negative, imagery was significantly 
positively associated with GI: state and trait guilt subscales. There was no significant 
association between imagery and GI: state and trait guilt when the picture-word 
stimulus was positive. However, the significant correlations between negative 
imagery, state and trait guilt were small (.19) and comparable in size to the 
correlations found between positive imagery, state and trait guilt (.13 and .15 
respectively). Whilst the correlations between positive imagery, state and trait guilt 
were not statistically significant, they were approaching significance (p = .06 and p = 
.03 respectively). As the magnitude of the correlations between positive and negative 
imagery and state and trait guilt is similar, the small difference found here is likely not 
meaningful and will not be discussed further in this chapter. 
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(2) Participants’ scores on the ‘imagery’ subscale showed a significant positive 
correlation with their scores on the OCI-R, when picture-word pairs were both 
positive and negative.  
(3) A propensity to use a verbal strategy was positively associated with scores on the 
OCI-R but not GI: state or trait guilt for both positive and negative picture-word pairs.  
(4) The ‘pleasantness’ and ‘experiencing’ subscales also showed significant positive 
associations with the OCI-R but not with the GI: trait and state guilt. These significant 
associations were present when participants responded to both positive and negative 
picture-word pairs.  
(5) Finally, the ‘experiencing’ subscale showed significant positive associations with 
both the OCI-R and the GI subscales. Again, these significant associations were 
present when participants responded to both positive and negative picture-word pairs.  
These exploratory analyses show that there were no meaningful differences in the 
associations between the PWT subscales, OCI-R and GI subscales when participants 
responded to positive and negative picture-word pairs. The valence of the stimulus did 
not affect the associations between the PWT subscales, the OCI-R and the GI 
subscales. 
From the analyses described above, it is important to consider that there were 
significant positive associations between all four of the PWT subscales and the OCI-
R, not just imagery. The findings in relation to imagery are discussed in the following 
section as they are pertinent to Hypothesis 2, but it should be noted that the positive 
correlations found between the ‘verbal’, ‘pleasantness’ and ‘experiencing’ subscales 
and the OCI-R may also be of conceptual importance. In addition, the ‘experiencing’ 
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subscale was positively correlated with the GI: state and trait guilt subscales. As these 
correlations were not related to the current study hypotheses they will not be 
considered further in this chapter, however in future research it would be interesting 
to explore these correlations further.  
It should be noted when considering the findings for Hypotheses 2 and 3 that the 
PWT imagery subscale measures participants’ propensity to deliberately generate 
imagery, rather than the involuntary spontaneous imagery experienced by people with 
OCD (e.g., Holmes et al., 2016). When considering the theoretical implications 
described in the following sections, it should be noted that a propensity to use 
imagery generally was related to level of guilt and OCD symptomatology.  It is not 
possible to comment on whether the specific images experienced by people with OCD 
were related to levels of guilt and OCD symptomatology as the PWT does not 
operationalise this construct in a manner that matches the spontaneous experience of 
imagery, as is true of OCD.  
4.4.1 Imagery and guilt. Several researchers have demonstrated that visual 
representations of information lead to higher levels of emotional arousal than verbal 
representations (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes, Mathews, et al., 2008; Pearson et 
al., 2015). Imagery can involve multiple sensory modalities, including bodily 
sensations which generate high levels of arousal (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). 
Intrusive negative imagery has been associated with high levels of negative emotional 
arousal and the findings of this study are consistent with this, as more frequent use of 
imagery had a small association with higher levels of state and trait guilt.  
In a seminal study on imagery, Lang (1979) found that imagery directly influenced 
emotional systems in the brain, as the information contained in an image provoked an 
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immediate autonomic or behavioural response. More recently, Holmes et al. (2008) 
proposed that imagery uses the same neural processes which are involved in 
perceiving ‘real’ events. In a functional neuroimaging study, Cabeza and St Jacques 
(2007) found that when participants were asked to imagine past and future emotional 
events, the amygdala (which has been strongly implicated in emotional processing) 
was activated. It is clear that there is a wealth of evidence which demonstrates that 
there is a link between mental imagery and emotional arousal. If imagery is linked 
with emotional arousal, it is possible that in OCD one of these emotions could be 
guilt, amongst other emotions such as anxiety. This could account for the significant 
association between imagery and guilt found in the current study.  
4.4.2 Imagery and OCD symptomatology. In OCD, it has been proposed 
that there is a direct link between intrusive imagery, emotional arousal and 
compulsive behaviour (Rachman, 2007). Images can seem very real when they are 
associated with high levels of emotional arousal, as the experience of intense emotion 
can ‘block’ people from attending to other relevant information (Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). People with OCD ‘foresee a wide range of possible negative outcomes’ which 
they believe are highly likely to happen (Salkovskis et al., 1995). This may be 
because an imagined future event causes a strong emotional response such as anxiety 
or guilt which is difficult to ignore. If people are visualising potential harm happening 
to other people, it follows that they experience high levels of guilt and act 
compulsively to neutralise distress. The association between imagery and OCD 
symptomatology found in the current study could be understood in this way.  
Confirming the association between the experience of intrusive imagery and OCD 
symptomatology, Speckens et al. (2007) found that up to 81% of people with severe 
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OCD reported intrusive mental imagery and, in 76% of these participants, this 
imagery resulted in increased engagement in compulsive behaviours. Rachman (2007) 
found that intrusive images of contamination such as germs invading the skin led to 
episodes of compulsive washing or cleaning behaviour. Intrusive images are clearly 
associated with OCD symptomatology and this finding was replicated in the current 
study. However, it is important to note that the methodology used can only 
demonstrate an association between imagery and OCD symptomatology, rather than a 
causative link between intrusive images and compulsive behaviour. 
4.4.3 Guilt and OCD.  People typically experience guilt when they feel 
responsible for a transgression (Chiang, 2013). In OCD, people often believe they are 
responsible for preventing harm from happening and this harm is interpreted as the 
result of a personal transgression, so people experience guilt (e.g., Mancini & 
Gangemi, 2004). In a meta-analysis, Shapiro and Stewart (2011) found that people 
with OCD have higher levels of both state and trait guilt than the general population, 
although this evidence was mixed. In the same meta-analysis, Shapiro and Stewart 
(2011) noted that guilt is an important predictor of distressing content in intrusive 
thoughts and images.  
In the current study, both state and trait guilt were significantly correlated with OCD 
symptomatology and the size of this correlation was large (Cohen, 1992b). Mancini 
and Gangemi (2004) proposed that guilt is an important contributory factor to OCD 
symptomatology, above and beyond responsibility. They state that compulsive 
behaviour occurs when people are afraid they will feel guilty as a consequence of a 
negative outcome. This fear of guilt then becomes a key component in the 
development of self-defeating patterns of behaviour (Jones & Kugler, 1993). It 
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therefore follows that guilt has been linked to moral, sexual and religious obsessions, 
as well as aggressive, contamination-related and doubting compulsions (Shapiro & 
Stewart, 2011). Mancini, Gangemi, Perdighe, and Marini (2008) also found that 
feelings of guilt are linked to not-just-right-experiences in people with OCD. There is 
clear support in the literature for an association between guilt and OCD 
symptomatology, as was found in the current study.  
Both state and trait guilt were found to be significantly associated with OCD 
symptomatology, however these constructs may be related to OCD in subtly different 
ways. Given the correlational design of this study it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions about the direction of the relationship between state guilt, trait guilt and 
OCD. However, the relationships between state guilt, trait guilt and OCD 
symptomatology described in the existing literature will be discussed here in order to 
consider the reasons for the significant association found in this study.  
In a study with a non-clinical population, Gangemi et al. (2007) induced state guilt in 
participants and found that people with high levels of trait guilt were more likely to 
evaluate a negative event as both probable and severe than individuals with low levels 
of trait guilt. The interaction between state and trait guilt meant that people displayed 
a similar probability bias to people with OCD, as participants with an underlying 
disposition to guilt (trait guilt), who felt guilty in that moment (state guilt) evaluated 
negative events as more likely to occur.  
Considering state guilt separately, several researchers have found that people with 
OCD process transient feelings of guilt more efficiently than the general population 
(Hennig-Fast et al., 2015; Jankowski & Takahashi, 2014). This could mean that 
people with OCD more frequently experience state guilt and have developed a 
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habituation response to it, which then becomes associated with learned compulsive 
behaviour. In support of this idea, D’Olimpio et al. (2013) found that when guilt was 
induced in people with OCD, this led to more subjective OCD-like experiences and a 
higher frequency of checking behaviour than in healthy controls or anxious 
participants. There is evidence that people with OCD may be more sensitive to the 
experience of state guilt and could therefore be affected by it in a different way from 
the general population.  
In summary, there is considerable support in the literature for an association between 
guilt and OCD symptomatology, as found in the current study. However, the direction 
and nature of the relationship between different types of guilt and OCD 
symptomatology remains unclear. This will be explored further in the suggestions for 
future research and clinical implications set out later on in this chapter.  
4.5 Hypothesis 3 – main findings and theoretical implications 
‘State and trait guilt will mediate the relationship between imagery and OCD 
symptomatology.’ 
This third and final hypothesis was supported by the results of the multiple mediation 
analysis, as state and trait guilt partially mediated the relationship between imagery 
and OCD symptomatology. Considered separately, state and trait guilt were also 
significant mediating variables between imagery and OCD symptomatology. 
Regression coefficients indicated firstly that more frequent use of imagery was 
associated with higher scores on the trait and state guilt subscales of the GI and 
secondly that higher scores on the trait and state guilt subscales were associated with 
higher levels of OCD symptomatology. In addition to the literature previously 
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described in relation to Hypothesis 2, the overall connection between imagery, guilt 
and OCD symptomatology will now be explored.  
In a recent study exploring imagery, when people were asked to imagine harm in 
vivid detail, moral considerations became more salient because people felt more 
involved in a scenario and had a stronger emotional reaction (Caruso & Gino, 2011). 
Similarly, Amit and Greene (2012) found that when people used a more visual 
cognitive style, they demonstrated higher levels of emotional arousal and were more 
likely to make an absolute judgment that ‘harm is wrong’. Other researchers have also 
found that when participants were presented with an image of a potential victim of 
harm or a scenario containing vivid descriptive details of harm, they had stronger 
aversive physiological reactions and were more likely to evaluate potentially immoral 
behaviour as morally wrong (Bartels, 2008; Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Clearly, 
imagery affects emotional arousal and consequently the moral decisions that people 
make. When people visualise or imagine harm, it seems likely that they feel guilty 
about the potential of causing harm, as discussed in relation to the previous 
hypothesis.  
The experience of state guilt has been shown to drive compulsive behaviour similar to 
that seen in OCD (reassurance-seeking, repeated checking, washing or other 
compensatory rituals; Mancini & Gangemi, 2004). It could be that an intrusive image 
depicting harm causes people with OCD to feel guilty for having a negative thought, 
as well as guilty about the prospect of causing harm. This intense feeling of state guilt 
then triggers an increase in compulsive behaviour which is intended to reduce or 
neutralise the experience of negative emotion. In this way, state guilt could mediate 
the relationship between intrusive imagery and OCD symptomatology. As discussed 
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previously, people with a high level of trait guilt may also be more sensitive to the 
experience of state guilt (Gangemi et al., 2007).  
Recent research has shown that people with OCD may be more sensitive to the 
experience of state guilt than non-clinical controls (Reuven et al., 2013). In this study, 
when people with OCD were made to feel guilty, they were significantly more likely 
than control participants to subsequently engage in compulsive washing behaviour 
(‘the Macbeth effect’). Relating this example to the current study, it is possible that 
people with OCD experience intrusive images of contamination which exacerbate 
feelings of guilt, leading to compensatory compulsive behaviour to manage their 
negative emotion.  
Alternatively, thought-action fusion may be an important concept in understanding 
the link between imagery, guilt and OCD symptomatology. Shafran, Thordarson, et 
al. (1996) pointed out that this cognitive bias means people with OCD view intrusive 
thoughts and harmful actions as morally equivalent. When people with OCD 
experience intrusive imagery, they interpret this as meaning they are a bad person for 
having that thought and it follows that they would feel guilty and act compulsively in 
an attempt to neutralise their distress.  
To summarise, people with OCD frequently experience intrusive thoughts which 
often take the form of mental images. If people with OCD have a pre-existing 
inclination to guilt (trait guilt), when they experience intrusive images they are more 
likely to feel guilty in response (state guilt) and to respond in a manner intended to 
reduce their distress (OCD symptomatology). In this way, state and trait guilt could 
partially mediate the relationship between imagery and OCD symptomatology, as was 
found to be the case in this study. However, the design of the study does not allow 
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conclusions to be drawn about the causal relationships between variables and this 
possible explanation should be interpreted with caution. Accordingly, this chapter will 
now proceed to discuss the main strengths and limitations of the current study.  
4.6 Strengths and limitations 
This study aimed to synthesise the research into imagery and morality in people with 
OCD due to the clear links in the existing literature between imagery, emotion, 
morality, and OCD symptomatology. The purpose of the study was to explore how 
these fragmented areas of research could combine to contribute to our theoretical 
understanding of the development and maintenance of OCD. The strengths and 
limitations of this study will now be discussed, to consider how successful the study 
was in achieving these aims.  
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4.6.1 Design.  This study used a cross-sectional design which means that as 
previously mentioned, it was not possible to draw conclusions about the potential 
causal nature of the relationships between variables. This did not have any significant 
implications for Hypotheses 1 and 2, where causation was not implied. However, 
given the nature of Hypothesis 3, it would have been interesting to investigate 
whether the statistically significant partial mediation found between imagery and 
OCD symptomatology via state and trait guilt, was supported by an experimental 
design. This would enable more robust conclusions to be drawn about the nature of 
the relationship between imagery, guilt and OCD symptomatology.  
4.6.2 Sample.  The current study recruited a convenience sample, using the 
internet to advertise. This methodology ensured that the research was highly visible, 
accessible and exceeded the number of participants required by the initial power 
calculation. The study had sufficient statistical power to detect effects while 
minimising the likelihood of a Type II error (Field, 2009).  
Both the low- and high-OC groups were recruited from a diverse range of websites 
(reddit.com, facebook.com, twitter.com, callforparticipants.com, studentminds.org.uk, 
ocdaction.org.uk), in addition to the Royal Holloway university participant credit and 
prize draw pools. As the participants were recruited from a range of sources, this 
made the sample heterogeneous and more likely to be representative of the general 
population. Descriptive statistics (see Table 3.5) indicated that the sample was diverse 
in terms of age, ethnicity, educational level and gender, across both the low- and high-
OC groups. However, the low- and high-OC groups differed significantly on age and 
education. Previous research has shown that people’s education level does not affect 
how they respond to moral dilemmas but age does have an effect (Kohlberg & 
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Kramer, 1969). Age was controlled in all statistical analyses wherever possible, 
however it might also have been worth considering controlling for participants’ level 
of education.  
Whilst the online methodology generated a large sample size, previous researchers 
have identified that in web-based research it is impossible to control the accuracy of 
participants’ responses to questions (Hauser et al., 2007). However, the internet is 
increasingly being used as a valuable research tool and when comparisons are made 
between web-based and more traditional pen and paper studies, typically the results 
are very similar (Baron & Siepmann, 2000). Participants’ responses to the moral 
dilemmas were checked for sense, consistent with the methodology described in 
Cushman et al. (2006). This criterion led to the removal of 13 participants’ data (6% 
of the participants who completed the survey) which indicated that 94% of the 
participants provided the expected responses. Overall, there were very few missing 
data points for those participants who completed the survey, and it appeared that the 
quality of the data was good.  
4.6.3 Analyses.  During data screening and analysis, it became apparent that 
a number of the variables in the study were not normally distributed. Data 
transformations were attempted, however these failed to address significant skew and 
kurtosis. Bootstrapping procedures were therefore used to address the problems with 
the data and it has been argued that this is a satisfactory and robust method (Singh & 
Xie, 2008).  
As described in the Results chapter, ‘age’ was controlled for in analyses wherever 
possible due to the significant difference found between low- and high-OC groups, as 
moral reasoning varies depending on developmental stage (Kohlberg & Kramer, 
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1969). There were also significant differences found between the low- and high-OC 
groups on both the HADS-A and HADS-D subscales. As mentioned previously (see 
Section 2.3.3) there is considerable comorbidity between OCD, anxiety disorders and 
depression (Adam et al., 2012). It is possible that the significant associations found 
between OCD symptomatology, imagery and guilt could be related to anxiety or 
depression rather than OCD symptoms, as anxiety and depression were not 
statistically controlled for in the relevant analyses. However, as there is considerable 
conceptual overlap between anxiety, depression and OCD symptomatology, it could 
be argued that controlling for anxiety and depression would be a stringent analysis 
strategy which would remove some of the variance attributable to OCD 
symptomatology. Future research might employ designs capable of separating out the 
effects of anxiety and depression without removing substantive OCD variance. 
4.6.4 Attrition.  As mentioned in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1), there was a 
high rate of attrition from the study (59%). A previous thesis which used similar 
methodology had an attrition rate of 45% (Trafford, 2016). A recent meta-analysis 
found that the drop-out rate from web-based research studies ranged from 2 to 83% 
(M = 31%; Melville et al., 2010), meaning that attrition in this study was above 
average.  
Most participants dropped out on the initial introduction, information and consent 
pages, or during the PWT later in the study. As the introduction, information and 
consent pages necessarily preceded any demographic information or other 
questionnaires, it was not possible to draw any conclusions about the characteristics 
of the participants who dropped out of the study. It may be that when people realised 
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what was involved in the study or the time needed to take part, they opted not to do 
so.  
Those participants who dropped out during the PWT may have done so due to 
boredom as the task was very repetitive. The task has previously been used in a lab-
based setting where participants were supervised by a researcher, meaning that they 
were less likely to disengage from the task or become distracted. Sixty-eight 
participants dropped out during this task, so it would be worth considering alternative 
methods of measuring visual/verbal cognitive style in future web-based studies. 
However, the PWT was selected as it has been proposed to be a more accurate 
measure of imagery than retrospective self-report measures which have been used 
previously (Holmes, Mathews, et al., 2008). This will be discussed in further detail in 
the following section of this chapter.  
4.6.5 Materials and measures 
Picture-Word Task 
As described in Chapter 2, the PWT was altered for the purposes of this study so that 
it was accessible in an online format. The instructions and stimuli remained the same, 
and the JavaScript functionality available in Qualtrics meant that the stimuli appeared 
on screen for the same amount of time as in the original lab-based task, so the task 
remained as similar as possible. Initial piloting of the survey on a small sample found 
that participants deemed the PWT to be acceptable, however the high drop-out found 
during the task indicates that this may not have been the case in the study sample. If 
using the task in future, it might be worth developing a shortened version of the task 
to test against the existing version, to make the online version of the task more 
interesting and acceptable to research participants.  
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Vignettes 
Earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that it might have been helpful to include a 
time limit when the moral dilemmas were presented to participants. Allowing 
participants an unlimited amount of time to respond might have meant that they 
became fatigued quickly, or that they were more able to engage in slow and deliberate 
moral reasoning (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Participants might also have been more 
likely to give a considered, socially desirable response. A number of researchers have 
found that participants have a tendency to make decisions in response to moral 
dilemmas which are aimed at impression management, rather than decisions which 
accurately reflect their real responses (Aguilar et al., 2013; Christensen & Gomila, 
2012). However, it could be argued that asking participants to complete an 
anonymous online survey removes the pressure to respond in a socially desirable 
manner.  
Considering the vignettes themselves, the use of moral dilemmas as tools in 
experimental psychology research has been criticised by some researchers. Bauman et 
al. (2014) raised concerns about the external validity of moral dilemmas, as they 
typically require participants to respond to scenarios which describe an artificial 
context. Thus, it could be argued that the judgments given in these scenarios do not 
accurately reflect general moral functioning. However, Christensen and Gomila 
(2012) advocate for the use of moral dilemmas in research, as they suggest that the 
content of the scenarios can be controlled in order to address a wide range of research 
questions. Whilst dilemmas are not entirely ecologically valid, they do allow valuable 
information about underlying psychological processes to be obtained (Moore et al., 
2011).  
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The vignettes used in the current study were identical to those used in the Cushman et 
al. (2006) paper which investigated the intention bias. There are no recognised 
standard procedures for validating moral dilemmas for use in research. The accepted 
practice seems to be that if moral dilemmas have been designed and piloted by experts 
in the field, they can reasonably be assumed to be valid. As the current study aimed to 
replicate the findings of the Cushman et al. (2006) study, the use of pre-existing 
vignettes was good research practice. The current study was successful in replicating 
the intention bias found in Cushman et al. and the moral philosophy literature (e.g.,  
Foot, 1967). 
Measure of OC 
The OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) was an important tool in this study, as people were 
classified into the low- and high-OC groups used in Hypothesis 1 on the basis of their 
scores on this measures. Additionally, people’s scores on the OCI-R were used in the 
analyses in Hypothesis 2 and 3. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the OCI-R is relatively 
brief and has shown good psychometric properties in both non-clinical and clinical 
populations, so it was selected for use in this study. Ideally, it would have been good 
to use a structured clinical interview such as the SCID-IV (First et al., 1996) to 
classify participants into groups, however due to the web-based methodology in this 
study this was not possible. It is important to bear in mind that the OCI-R only 
measures the presence of OCD symptoms and is not a valid tool for diagnosis. The 
current study can only draw conclusions about moral reasoning, imagery and guilt in 
relation to OCD symptoms rather than an OCD diagnosis. 
However, the web-based approach was chosen in order to maximise the sample size 
and increase statistical power. The target sample size was achieved and exceeded, 
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which may not have been possible if participants had been required to meet with a 
researcher in person. This would also have compromised the anonymity that was 
possible with an online sample.  
Responsibility beliefs and moral TAF 
This study used a single measure of OC phenomena (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) to 
reduce the questionnaire burden on participants. As previously mentioned (see 
Section 2.3.2), a measure of responsibility beliefs (e.g., RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000) 
was not included in the study. However, Franklin et al. (2009) found that there were 
differences in responsibility between people with OCD and control participants and it 
could be that there were differences in responsibility beliefs between the low- and 
high-OC groups in this study. These potential differences could have been important 
in interpreting the associations found between guilt, imagery and OC 
symptomatology, as heightened responsibility has been identified as an important 
construct in OCD (e.g., Salkovskis et al., 1995) and moral reasoning. As 
responsibility beliefs were not measured in the current study, it is not possible to 
determine whether any group differences were due to heightened responsibility 
beliefs. This is a limitation of the study and in future research, it would be useful to 
consider including a measure of responsibility beliefs.  
It could also have been useful to include a measure of moral TAF as this has been 
shown to be strongly related to responsibility and is relevant to moral decision-
making (Shafran & Rachman, 2004). However, Shafran and Rachman’s (2004) 
review of TAF showed that moral TAF is not ‘significantly and reliably related’ to 
obsessions or compulsions. The authors suggest that measuring TAF is useful to help 
people identify dysfunctional beliefs rather than providing a measure of 
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psychopathology. As this study investigated the relationships between OC symptoms, 
imagery and guilt, a direct measure of OC symptomatology was considered most 
suitable.  
Survey flow 
The order in which participants completed measures was carefully considered (see 
Table 2.1 for an overview). Due to the high drop-out reported in a similar study 
(Trafford, 2016), the different measures were split across the survey to maintain 
participants’ interest. Of note, the GI (Kugler & Jones, 1992) was placed between the 
two blocks of moral dilemmas. It may be that presenting the GI before the second 
block of moral dilemmas heightened participants’ awareness of moral concerns and 
had an effect on their responses to this second block. However, participants were 
aware throughout the survey that they would be asked questions pertinent to morality, 
as the study advertisements and information page referenced ‘Moral reasoning and 
OCD’, so it may have been the case that morality was primed throughout study 
participation. If conducting the study again, it might be helpful to remove references 
to morality, such that this was not primed, and to consider moving the GI to the end of 
the survey.  
Due to the limitations of the Qualtrics platform and the need to preserve participant 
anonymity, participants accessed the study by clicking on a link posted on each of the 
recruitment websites. This meant that it was not possible to track where participants 
were recruited from. It would have been interesting to explore whether there were any 
meaningful differences in participants’ responses depending on whether they were 
recruited through the RHUL participant pools, social media, or mental health forums. 
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If repeating this study, it would be helpful to add a question into the demographic 
information page to ask how participants found out about the study.  
4.7 Suggestions for future research 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the lack of difference in intention bias between 
the low- and high-OC groups could be attributed to the fact that the vignettes did not 
describe OCD-relevant concerns. In investigations of a subtly different moral 
reasoning bias (omission), researchers only found differences in moral reasoning 
when the scenarios given to participants were OCD-relevant (Franklin et al., 2009; 
Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000). It was not possible to develop and validate such vignettes 
in the timescale given for a DClinPsy research project, however it would be 
interesting to repeat this study using vignettes that described OCD-relevant concerns. 
It is possible that any differences in moral reasoning would then become more 
apparent.  
It was also suggested that the study failed to find a difference in intention bias 
because participants were psychologically distant from the vignettes. To address this, 
a manipulation which engaged participants in the dilemmas could be used. For 
example, Conway and Gawronski (2013) showed their participants a photograph of 
the hypothetical victim described in the moral dilemmas. The literature suggests that 
using a visual cue would cause participants to behave more empathically (Amit & 
Greene, 2012) and people with OCD might be more sensitive to this manipulation, 
meaning they were less psychologically distant from vignettes.  
This study adds to the literature which suggests that imagery and guilt are implicated 
in the development and maintenance of OCD. However, typical measures of OCD 
symptomatology do not include distressing imagery or pathological guilt. As these 
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constructs appear to be important, it would be interesting to develop and validate new 
measures which encompass these additional symptoms.  
The adequate measurement of distressing imagery in OCD could also facilitate the 
development of novel interventions targeted at imagery. Holmes, Lang, et al. (2008) 
suggested that training people in using positive imagery is an important direction for 
future research. If distressing imagery is related to negative emotions such as fear, 
disgust and guilt and positive imagery is linked with reductions in negative affect 
(Holmes, Mathews, et al., 2008), training people in using positive imagery could be 
potentially useful intervention in OCD. Shapiro and Stewart (2011) propose that 
pathological guilt is an important maintenance factor in OCD and an indication for 
poor prognosis; if a positive imagery intervention could potentially reduce levels of 
pathological guilt, this would be important to investigate in future research.  
Considering imagery further, Holmes, Lang, et al. (2008) and Nelis, Vanbrabant, 
Holmes, and Raes (2012) have reported mixed findings on how the perspective 
described during the experience of imagery has an impact on affect. There is some 
evidence that taking a first-person perspective generates more intense emotion (e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), however Nelis et al. (2012) did not replicate this finding in 
the case of positive affect. In the current study, participants were presented with 
positive and negative picture-word pairs, and asked to combine these either verbally 
or using imagery. It may be that participants chose to take either a first-person or 
observer perspective when using imagery and given that this might have influenced 
their levels of affect, it would be interesting to consider perspective-taking in future 
research. To design adequate interventions for distressing imagery, it would be useful 
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to understand the perspective taken by people with OCD when they experience 
distressing images.  
The mediational analyses for Hypothesis 3 showed that state and trait guilt partially 
mediated the relationship between imagery and OCD symptomatology. As these 
mediating effects were partial, it would be interesting to consider whether there are 
other factors in the relationship between imagery and OCD symptoms that could 
explain the remaining variance. Future research could also make use of an 
experimental design to test potential causal links between imagery and OCD 
symptoms. Holmes et al. (2009a, as cited in Holmes et al., 2016) proposed that mental 
imagery may amplify maladaptive thought processes in depression and it would be 
interesting to research whether this might also be the case in OCD.  
4.8 Clinical implications 
This study set out to explore moral reasoning, imagery and guilt in OCD, with a view 
to contributing to the literature on the development, maintenance and potential 
treatment of this debilitating disorder. OCD is a complex condition which is 
associated with considerable suffering, functional impairment and economic burden to 
both the individual and the health-care system (Markarian et al., 2010). Whilst 
psychological treatments for OCD have been developed, these remain approximately 
50-60% effective and there is considerable scope to improve the understanding and 
treatment of the disorder (Öst et al., 2015). The study’s statistically significant 
findings in relation to imagery and guilt will now be discussed in terms of their 
clinical implications.  
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4.8.1 Guilt.  It is clear from the literature that guilt plays a part in the 
development and maintenance of OCD (Shafran, Thordarson, et al., 1996; Shapiro & 
Stewart, 2011) and it has been suggested that high levels of guilt negatively affect 
both the severity of the disorder and likely treatment outcome (Mancini & Gangemi, 
2004; Nissenson, 2006). It remains unclear whether unresolved guilt in OCD leads to 
relapse following an otherwise effective course of treatment, or if guilt is simply an 
important component in the development of the disorder (Shapiro & Stewart, 2011). 
Mancini and Gangemi (2004) suggest that high levels of guilt account for the inability 
of people with OCD to hear and comprehend reassuring information. If people with 
OCD experience high levels of guilt, this could cause an ‘emotional reasoning’ 
cognitive bias, meaning that beliefs then correspond with emotions and that it is 
difficult to process contradictory information (Clark & Beck, 2011). This is supported 
by findings in both clinical and non-clinical populations which show that the 
experience of guilt increases compulsive behaviour (D’Olimpio et al., 2013; Gangemi 
et al., 2007).  
The findings of this study provide support for the involvement of guilt in OCD, and it 
follows that guilt could be an important treatment target. To date, there are very few 
studies that specifically address pathological guilt as a component in treatment. 
Cosentino et al. (2012) proposed that the function of compulsive behaviour is to 
reduce the distressing experience of feeling guilty. Guilt is appraised as unacceptable 
and painful, and individuals engage in compulsive behaviour in an attempt to 
neutralise this negative emotional experience. Cosentino et al. (2012) found that an 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) intervention designed to increase the 
acceptability of guilt led to a significant reduction in overt OCD symptoms. It should 
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be noted that the sample size in this study was small and the researchers did not 
include a control group for comparison. However, given the strength of the existing 
evidence in the literature and the findings of the current study, guilt should be 
considered when assessing and treating OCD. There is considerable scope to develop 
assessment and treatment protocols which take account of guilt as a maintenance 
factor.  
4.8.2 Imagery.  The results of this study also implicated mental imagery in 
relation to OCD symptomatology, both independently of and in combination with 
guilt. Recently, increasing attention has been paid to imagery as a key maintenance 
factor in a number of clinical disorders (Holmes et al., 2016; Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). The perceived reality of clinical imagery seems to lead to increased emotional 
arousal which then influences behaviour and beliefs (Pearson et al., 2015).  
Speckens et al. (2007) noted that 76% of people with severe OCD report intrusive 
imagery, and these distressing images are directly linked with engagement in 
compulsive behaviour. The current study suggests that the experience of distressing 
imagery is exacerbated by guilt, and this links with increased OC symptoms. 
However, as the design of this study was cross-sectional and mediation analysis 
implies a causal relationship between variables, this potential finding should be 
interpreted with caution. When mediation analysis is based on a cross-sectional 
design, it is only possible to claim that the findings are ‘compatible with a causal 
model’ rather than asserting that causality has been proven (Haase, Mountford, & 
Waller, 2007). This study has demonstrated that there are relationships between 
imagery, guilt and OC symptomatology but it cannot prove the direction of causation. 
It is tentatively suggested on the basis of existing theory that the experience of 
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imagery and subsequent guilt are distressing, and so people with OCD engage in 
compulsive behaviour to reduce their distress and guilt and reassure themselves that 
the imagined negative outcome will not happen in reality. 
If distressing imagery leads to such a strong emotional response (guilt or other 
emotions), it is important that imagery is assessed in the context of psychopathology 
(Holmes et al., 2016). Often, the focus in clinical assessment is on verbal cognitions, 
meaning that the focus in treatment remains on verbal techniques (e.g., thought 
challenging in CBT). There is now a developing evidence base for the use of 
therapeutic mental imagery techniques in a range of clinical presentations (Ji et al., 
2015; Pearson et al., 2015). Using mental imagery may provide a more direct route to 
modifying distressing emotion in CBT than verbal thought challenging (Holmes, 
Mathews, et al., 2008).  
There is tentative evidence that imagery rescripting to update the meanings of 
aversive memories could be effective in OCD (Arntz, 2012; Veale et al., 2015). 
However, this technique would only be effective in a subgroup of people with OCD 
who have intrusive images that are emotionally linked with an aversive memory. In a 
recent study (case series), Mpavaenda (2016) found that one participant out of six 
demonstrated a reduction in the vividness of intrusive imagery, combined with a 
reduction in shame, guilt and OCD symptoms. This participant was experiencing 
intrusive images related to a previous traumatic evstent. This study therefore provided 
limited evidence that imagery rescripting could be an effective treatment for intrusive 
imagery in OCD only when intrusive imagery is related to a previous traumatic event.  
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4.8.3 Contribution to current knowledge.  This study aimed to explore 
moral reasoning processes in OCD and constructs (imagery and guilt) that could 
account for potential differences in moral reasoning. Morality in OCD has previously 
been researched, in relation to deontological and utilitarian principles, the ‘omission 
bias’, and personal/impersonal moral dilemmas, however to the author’s knowledge 
the ‘intention bias’ has not been investigated in relation to OCD. It was proposed that 
due to TAF (Shafran, Thordarson, et al., 1996), people with OCD might interpret 
having a ‘bad’ thought as morally equivalent to harm that occurs in reality, especially 
as people with OCD are more sensitive to moral concerns than the general population 
(Melli et al., 2017). This ‘moral equivalence’ could mean that people with OCD 
understand intention differently and do not display the intention bias found in the 
general population. However, the findings of this study were not consistent with this 
prediction, as they demonstrated that people with both low and high levels of 
obsessive-compulsiveness make moral decisions consistent with the ‘intention bias’. 
This study adds to the limited evidence that there is no general moral reasoning 
difference in people with OCD and consistent with previous research, any moral 
reasoning differences may be limited to specific domains (Franklin et al., 2009; Wroe 
& Salkovksis, 2000). It also provides novel evidence that the intention bias is present 
in people with both low- and high- levels of OC.  
The current study also explored imagery and guilt and how these constructs are 
related to OCD symptomatology. There are clear links in the existing literature 
between imagery and affect, particularly negative imagery and anxiety, fear and 
disgust (Holmes et al., 2016; Ji et al., 2015). As negative emotions, including guilt, 
are key maintaining factors in OCD (Shapiro & Stewart, 2011), it was proposed firstly 
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that there may be a positive association between guilt, imagery and OCD 
symptomatology and secondly that guilt may mediate the association between 
imagery and OCD symptomatology. The findings of this study were consistent with 
these predictions, therefore taking into account the limitations described earlier in this 
chapter, this study provides tentative evidence that guilt is another negative emotion 
evoked by distressing imagery. A better understanding of the links between guilt and 
imagery could further our conceptual understanding of OCD and help to develop new 
cognitive-behavioural, imagery or emotion-focused treatments. 
4.8.4 Summary and conclusions. This study provides support for the 
involvement of distressing imagery, state and trait guilt in OCD symptomatology. 
Specifically, there was an association firstly between imagery and state and trait guilt, 
and secondly between imagery and OCD symptomatology. State and trait guilt 
partially mediated the relationship between imagery and OCD symptomatology. The 
main hypothesis regarding altered moral reasoning in OCD was not supported, 
however it was tentatively proposed that if the scenarios presented had been relevant 
to OCD-type concerns, the expected effect might have been found. This was noted 
accordingly in the suggestions for future research.  
The existing literature suggests that imagery and guilt (in some form) are both 
important factors in the development and maintenance of OCD, and the findings of 
the current study confirm this. However, to date, researchers have proposed that state 
guilt, trait guilt, deontological guilt or a fear of guilt could all be implicated in OCD 
symptomatology, and there is no clear consensus on the type of guilt which is most 
relevant. Whilst this study provides some evidence in favour of the involvement of 
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state and trait guilt, this is by no means definitive and further research into the 
accurate measurement and description of guilt in OCD is clearly required.  
However, there is an emerging evidence base regarding the clinical utility of 
interventions tailored to pathological levels of guilt and distressing imagery. These 
studies show small but clinically meaningful treatment outcomes, and the findings of 
the current study suggest that designing interventions with these factors in mind could 
lead to a much-needed improvement in treatment outcomes for people with OCD.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Example study advertisement
Moral reasoning in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
 
My name is Rebecca Dale. I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist studying at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. I am supervised by Dr Olga Luzon (Clinical 
Psychologist) on a doctoral research project looking at moral decision making in 
OCD. 
What is this study about? 
This research looks at some of the factors which may be involved in how people make 
moral decisions. Specifically, we are interested in whether there are similarities and 
differences in how people with and without a diagnosis of OCD make decisions. A 
clearer understanding of decision making processes in OCD could help to explain the 
disorder and to develop more effective psychological treatments. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There are not expected to be any direct benefits to you as a result of taking part in this 
study. However, we hope that the information we get from this study will potentially 
improve the treatment of people with OCD in the future. 
Who can take part? 
We are aiming to recruit as many adults (18+) as possible with and without symptoms 
of OCD. 
What do I need to do? 
If you choose to take part, you will be asked to complete an anonymous online survey 
which should take approximately 45 minutes to complete. The survey is composed of 
short questionnaires about mood, a series of moral dilemmas for you to read and 
answer questions about and a task to classify your style of thinking (visual or verbal). 
If you complete the survey, we will enter you into a prize draw to win one of four £25 
Amazon vouchers as a thank you. 
How do I take part? 
Please follow this link if you would like to read more information about the study and 
to take part:https://rhulpsychology.eu.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_a93pI9mlOKaVtsx 
Downloads:  
Information Sheet  Ethical Approval
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Appendix C: Demographic questionnaire 
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Appendix D: OCI-R 
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Appendix E: HADS 
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Appendix F: Guilt Inventory 
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Appendix G: Moral dilemmas 
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Appendix H: Picture-Word Task 
Q37 Picture Word Task Instructions: 
On every trial you will see one picture paired with one word. There are a total of 20 
pictures and 40 words, so each picture is paired with two different words (one at a 
time), the order you will see them is random.  What we want you to do is to 
COMBINE each picture with the word shown below it.  For example:    Sour     How 
could you combine these?  You can think of a sentence, for example - the sour lemon 
made a delicious pie. Or you could imagine how a sour lemon might look and taste.   
Ok, let's go through the task...  Press 'next' to continue. 
 
Q38 Example 
So, on each trial you will see the picture and word on the computer screen:     
 
Image -  displayed here (not included due to copyright restrictions) 
 
 
Word -  displayed beneath picture (not included due to copyright restrictions) 
 
Now please COMBINE this picture and word...            
Q140   In the real task the picture and word is only shown for a limited time, after that 
you are going to see a blank screen.  As soon as you have finished combining, just 
press NEXT.  There is no need to repeatedly generate multiple combinations.  Once 
you press 'NEXT', a series of questions will follow.
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Appendix I: Information Sheet 
Information for participants 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study looks at some of the factors which may be involved in how people make 
moral decisions. Specifically, we are interested in whether there are similarities and 
differences in how people with and without a diagnosis of OCD make decisions. We 
are aiming to recruit as many adults as possible with and without symptoms of OCD. 
A clearer understanding of decision making processes in OCD could help to explain 
the disorder and to develop more effective psychological treatments.  
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether you wish to take part in the research. You can 
contact the research team if you would like to speak further before deciding whether 
or not you would like to participate. You will be asked to complete an online consent 
form to show you have agreed to take part. You are free to withdraw from the study at 
any time, without giving a reason. If you are a student at Royal Holloway University, 
withdrawing from the study will not affect your education.  
What will the study involve? 
You will be asked to complete an online survey which should take approximately 45 
minutes to complete. The survey is composed of short questionnaires about mood, a 
series of moral dilemmas for you to read and answer questions about and a task to 
classify your style of thinking (visual or verbal).  
What are the possible disadvantages/risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks to taking part in this project. However, the 
questionnaires ask about your mood and there is a small risk you may feel worried or 
distressed. If this is the case, please either contact the lead researcher (Rebecca Dale – 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist) for advice about support, or you will find further 
information about useful contacts at the end of the survey.  
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There are not expected to be any direct benefits to you as a result of taking part in this 
study. However, we hope that the information we get from this study will potentially 
improve the treatment of people with OCD in the future. As a thank you for your 
time, we will enter everyone who completes the study into a prize draw to win one of 
four £25 Amazon vouchers.  
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any concerns, you should initially contact the researchers, Rebecca Dale 
or Dr Olga Luzon, who will do their best to address your concerns (see contact details 
below). If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can contact the 
sponsor of this study, Royal Holloway University (Tel.: 01784 414 012). 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. Only the researchers will know whether you have taken part. Your questionnaire 
responses will be anonymised by giving them a unique identification code and this 
information will be stored in a password-protected database. Your consent will be 
stored separately from the anonymous information you provide for the research 
project. If you choose to provide your email address to be entered into the prize draw 
or to receive a summary of the results, this will be stored in a part of the database that 
is separate from other responses, so there will be no connection between your identity 
and your answers. Your contact information will not be used for any other purpose.  
What will happen to the results of the study? 
This study forms part of a doctoral thesis and is intended for submission for 
publication in a relevant peer-reviewed journal. No individual participants will be 
identifiable in any written report resulting from this study. If you provide your email 
address, a summary of the findings will be available to you after the study has ended.  
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The study is organised and funded by Royal Holloway, University of London, as part 
of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology for Rebecca Dale.  
Who has reviewed the project? 
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The study has been reviewed by Royal Holloway, University of London Psychology 
Department Ethics Committee and given approval.  
If you would like to participate or wish to discuss the study further you can 
contact: 
Lead researcher: Rebecca Dale, Trainee Clinical Psychologist (Royal Holloway, 
University of London) 
Email: Rebecca.dale.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk Telephone: 01784 414 012 
Academic supervisor: Dr Olga Luzon, Clinical Psychologist (Royal Holloway, 
University of London) 
Email: Olga.luzon@rhul.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for reading this information!
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Appendix J: Consent 
 
174 
 
Appendix K: Ethical approval 
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Appendix L: Debrief 
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Appendix M: Picture-Word task stimuli (examples) 
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